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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to understand the significance of black 
consciousness as an attempt at creating the possibility of a 
black identity which challenged the apartheid definition of 
"black". As a discursive event, black consciousness signifies 
the search for self and place within a national context 
organised according to an exclusive/inclusive logic and is 
thereby shown to participate in a discourse of nationalism. 
The means by which this identitarian search is conducted is 
scrutinised with a view to establishing its origins within 
the topology of apartheid discourse itself. Through an 
analysis of essentialist racial discourses, the 
reconstruction of a positive black identity on the basis of 
a complete recovery of a pre-colonial reality and cultural 
purity is shown to be unattainable. Although understandable 
in the context of the cultural denigration suffered by blacks 
under apartheid, the claim to an authentic and independent 
resistance is revealed as being inevitably limited. 
This thesis therefore argues for a contextual understanding 
of identitarian projects such as black consciousness, on the 
basis that its particular aims were governed to a large 
extent by the prevailing conditions of apartheid oppression. 
� The psychological focus of the black consciousness movement 
meant that the movement concentrated on changing individual 
self-images rather than attacking the physical manifestations 
of power; hence, its concern with the assertion of i_dentity 
and the incorporation of black people into history as 
-
subjects. An important component of the legacy of black 
consciousness is the demand that it made on blacks to 
recognise their active agency in history and to transform 
their self-conception from that of passive victim into that 
of historical agent. This thesis attempts to trace this 
development in the political theory of Steve Biko, the 
fictional work of Mongane Serote and the cultural expression 
contained in and embodied by Staf frider Magazine. While 
conscious of the differences of context that such a study 
embraces, this thesis also attempts to draw links between 
particular manifestations of black consciousness, both 
political and cultural, and the project of European Modernity 
with the object of revealing, not how the terms of modernity 
are reproduced by black consciousness, but how they must 
inevitably be redefined. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his preface to Steve Biko's I Write What I Like, Aelred 
Stubbs C.R. writes that "the definitive writing on Steve can 
only come from one who writes from within his own tradition -
- historic, linguistic and political"(v). I am not from 
within Biko's historic, linguistic and political tradition in 
the sense that ·stubbs defines it and I do not claim 
definitive status for my work on Biko and the black 
consciousness movement. My interest in black consciousness is 
motivated by a concern with the way in which colonialism has 
itself shaped the colonised and in that way determines the 
course of anti-colonial resistance. The black consciousness 
movement and Stephen Biko himself, as a subject embodying the 
quest for recognition of a particular "self" and "nation", 
provide opportunities for examining the attempt to overcome 
the deprivations and restrictions of colonialism, and 
investigate the possibilities for a "postcolonial order, 
within a specifically South African context. 
In its substance, then, this project is propositional rather 
than definitive and at all times attempts to maintain an 
awareness of .its authorial discursive origins. Much of the 
impetus behind the black consciousness movement's desire to 
seek an independent voice, apart from the more obvious 
suppression inflicted by the apartheid government, lay in 
what Biko saw as a particularly paternalistic attitude 
towards blacks by so-called liberal whites. I have no wish to 
re-assume a privileged position of this nature. 
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The problem that Biko defines, to a large extent, is the 
problem of finding a position for one's self within the ambit 
of a broader political framework, structured, in the case of 
South Africa, according to colonial imperatives. Biko's 
organising principle of race, of "blackness" in particular, 
is conceived primarily at the level of the individual and 
takes, as its starting point, the need for a form of 
psychological/attitudinal reassessment. For Biko, it is this 
psychological reappraisal of the self which lays the 
groundwork for a reflexive political programme and which 
presents the relationship between self and society, to a 
certain extent, as a symbiotic one, informed by an 
understanding of the uniqueness of a racial cultural 
heritage. 
The prominence given to the term "non-racial" by the African 
National Congress (ANC) and, to a lesser degree, other 
political parties during the build-up to the South African 
elections of April 1994, signifies an interesting divergence 
with the dominant political discourses of the past. The 
overwhelming electoral success of the ANC (both at a national 
and local level), which marketed itself repeatedly (and still 
does) as a "non-racial" organisation/party, concerned to 
build "non-racialism" in South Africa, speaks of an all­
inclusive nationalism, which throws into relief the racially 
exclusive strategy of the black consciousness movement during 
the late 1960's and throughout the decade of the 1970's. The 
racial de-emphasis which characterised the parlance of the 
recent pre- and post-election era, points to the relevance of 
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an examination of the conditions (both discursive and 
material) under which the adoption of "race" as an organising 
principle became perceived as a necessary strategy of 
resistance -- as was the case during the era of apartheid 
oppression and the implications of this organising 
category for the type of political programme this created. 
Political theorist, Aletta Norval substantiates this line of 
justification by arguing from a position which sees the 
possibilities of the present and future being necessarily 
influenced by the past: 
In the midst of discussions on the form of post­
apartheid society, the need for a retroactive 
understanding of apartheid, and the division of 
the social accompanying it, have emerged with 
renewed urgency ("Social Ambiguity and Apartheid" 
120). 
What Norval's comments suggest, apart from the more manifest 
notion that we learn/are able to learn from the lessons of 
the past, is the idea of a mutually-influential relationship 
between South African apartheid and South African resistance 
movements, particularly black consciousness resistance. If we 
accept the notion of black consciousness as an instance or 
manifestation of, the "division of the social accompanying 
[apartheid]", it becomes important to examine the historical 
context of black consciousness not only in terms of its 
imperatives as a resistance movement against apartheid, but 
also, and equally importantly, in terms of the particular 
constitution of the dominant discourse of apartheid. This 
line of analysis finds justification through the words of 
Steve Biko: 
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Those who are at the seeking end, that is, those who 
want justice, who want an egalitarian society, can only 
pursue their aspirations according to the resistance 
offered by the opposition and if the opposition is 
prepared to fight with their backs to the wall, conflict 
can't be avoidable (sic) ... 1
Many scholars and followers of black consciousness might 
insist that Biko's words are uncharacteristic in that they 
propagate a capitulation to violence whereas in reality it 
seemed that the black consciousness movement, particularly 
Biko himself, continuously emphasised the merits of non­
violent resistance. Others might assert the falsehood of any 
suggestion that black consciousness took apartheid as its 
point of departure and as its terms of reference, especially 
in view of the fact that black consciousness was seen to make 
overt attempts to propagate an independent style and strategy 
of resistance and to distance itself completely from the 
destructive influences of white/western-inspired apartheid 
dominance. I,will ·argue, however, that as "independent" and 
as "authentic" as the black consciousness movement set itself 
up (and was perceived) to be, its origins were fundamentally 
rooted within the structure or rather, within the topology of 
oppression characteristic of its particular historical milieu 
-- that of pervasive colonialism and apartheid. 
Mary Louise Pratt's analysis of the colonial encounter is 
instructive in this regard. Her term "contact zone" attempts 
to describe not only the point (physical and temporal) at 
which cultures come together in the context of differential 
power relations, but more importantly, seeks to foreground 
the "interactive, improvisational dimensions of colonial 
encounters" ( 7) A "contact" perspective 
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therefore 
understands colonial relations, not in terms of an absolute 
isolation of colonizer from colonised (or vice-versa), but in 
terms of "copresence, interaction, interlocking 
understandings and practices ... " ( 7). Pratt's concept of 
autoethnography, I would argue, is la� a result of the 
interface provided by the "contact zone". Autoethnography 
describes the process whereby the "colonized subjects 
undertake to represent themselves in ways that engage with 
the colonizer's own terms" (7), This is a process involving 
"partial collaboration with an appropriation of the idioms of 
the conqueror" ( 7). The black consciousness attempt to retain 
a particular racial distinctiveness while at the same time 
endorse the transformation of society on the basis of a new 
humanist value system, means that the movement's position is 
paradoxical at the same time as it is transformative. Biko's 
opinion that the oppressed are to "examine and question old 
concepts, values and systems ... always keeping in mind our 
fundamental beliefs and values" is indicative of this 
ambiguity. The process of selection and invention from the 
cultural forms of the colonizer by the colonized allows for 
an appropriation of the "colonizer's own terms", but for the 
purpose of change rather than that of reproduction. 
Thus, an analysis of the 
consciousness and apartheid, 
"contact 
while 
zone" of black 
characterised by 
"interlocking understandings and practices" (Pratt 7), at the 
same time, also holds possibilities for challenge and change. 
page 6 
In chapter one I attempt to lay the theoretical groundwork 
for the establishment of an understanding of the organising 
logic of discourses, Black consciousness is conceived as a 
discursive event, signifying the search for self and place 
within a national context organised according to an 
exclusionary/inclusionary logic. Black consciousness is 
further theorised in terms of Richard Terdiman's concept of 
"counter-discourse", a concept which allows black 
consciousness to be seen as an oppositional, but parallel 
discourse in relation to apartheid. 
Chapter two offers a theoretical discussion of the need for 
identity construction and suggests, following Ernesto 
Laclau's thesis, that the need for the order which identity 
brings, particularly in contexts of disorder, is (initially) 
of more consequence than the particular content which such 
order claims to promote. The need for order and a fixed 
identity is understood and discussed as a characteristic of 
modernity. The idea of an intrinsic link between · "true" 
identity and the social order is challenged and this is shown 
to have consequences for the way in which particular 
identitarian claims, particularly that of black 
consciousness, are understood. 
Chapter three discusses the grounds for comparison which 
exist between race-oriented African discourses and the racial 
theories expounded by European theorists at the height of 
colonialism and argues that while similarities undoubtedly 
exist, there is also evidence of real differences based on 
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both ethics and context. The similarities which exist between 
black consciousness and negritude will also be examined with 
a view to demonstrating the importance of a contextual 
understanding of movements of this nature. 
In chapter four, I look at the fictional manifestations of 
black consciousness thought in Mongane Serote's only novel, 
To Every Birth Its Blood and I argue that, while the black 
world and its signifiers are prominent in the novel and 
certainly influence many of its concerns, ultimately, the 
ideology promoted by the novel is that of non-racial politics 
as embodied by the African National Congress, Serote's 
reliance on black consciousness ideas, however, provides an 
opportunity to examine the novel within a modernist 
framework, governed by the imperatives of a form of black 
nationalism. 
Chapter five widens the scope of the analysis by examining 
the cultural significance of the magazine Staffrider. 
Produced at the height of black consciousness sentiment, I 
argue that the magazine assists in the process of 
interpellating black writers into an "imagined cornmuni ty" and 
thereby extends the influence of an essentially modern 
community of individuals, each constituting components of a 
larger national whole. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Politics as Discourse : Methodological assumptions 
A key premise of this study is the conceptualization .of the 
black consciousness movement in terms of what David Attwell 
has referred to as a "discursive event". Attwell writes that 
the emergence of black consciousness in the early 1970 's 
constituted a major "discursive event" which signified an 
attempt to combine a particular perspective of the self with 
a larger, historical view (28). The relationship between the 
self and history presents a problem of agency, a concept 
which, according to Attwell, is concerned with "nationhood", 
a somewhat loose term which attempts to reflect the 
imperatives of "inclusion and exclusion, of finding or not 
finding a place for one's own particular story within the 
framework of the broader, national narrative" ( 24). While 
this concept has obvious implications for natiqnal 
political/racial relations, I would argue that the manner in
which the term "nationhood" is understood is still determined 
by the intellectual heritage of European and American 
modernity. Paul Gilroy has given this "intellectual heritage" 
the label of "problematic" (121) and accuses it specifically 
of fostering, 
the continuing aspiration to acquire a supposedly 
authentic, natural and stable identity ... (which] 
identity is the premise of a thinking 'racial' 
self that is both socialised and unified by its 
connection with other kindred souls .. ,(121). 
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The implications of this "problematic" reliance on what may 
be termed the discourse of modernity, will be taken up in the 
course of the following chapters. 
Richard Terdiman's conception of discourse and 
counterdiscourse also addresses the issue of the power of 
exclusion/inclusion contained within the organising logic of 
discourses. While expressing reservations about defining 
discourse generally and without recognising the "problematic 
from which it comes", Terdiman nonetheless, tentatively 
suggests that discourses may be understood as, 
the complexes of signs and practices which 
organise social existence and social reproduction. 
In their structured, material persistence, 
discourses are what give differential substance to 
membership in a social group or class or 
formation, which mediate an internal sense of 
belonging, an outward sense of otherness (54). 
In discursive terms then, South African apartheid has 
mediated the organisation of social existence into racial 
categories based on principles of inclusion and exclusion. 
The "outward sense of otherness" created by such a system, 
based on fundamentally discriminating principles, however, 
opens itself up to challenges of legitimacy which give rise 
to a discourse of resistance. The discourse of resistance, 
however, despite its oppositional stance, pursues a similar 
mediation: it seeks to create an internal sense of 
specifically "black" belonging, and condones a rejection of 
a "white" value system based on a perception of false values. 
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Understood as a particular discourse, black consciousness 
reflects the underlying social practices of resistance in 
South Africa during the late 1960's and during the 1970's. 
Terdiman argues that the 1848 French Revolution marked the 
demise of the dynamic which "sustained explicitly political 
counter-discourses in their negation of the degraded here­
and-now and their projection of a more optimistic 
alternative" and argues instead that counter-discourses have 
since proceeded in "more subterranean and more subtle ways" 
(71). I would argue, however, that my application of the 
concept of counter-discourse in a fairly recent South African 
context, draws for its defence, on Terdiman's assertion that 
any particular discourse must "be referred to the problematic 
from which it emerges, for this determines its operational 
sense'' (54). I would argue, therefore, that the "explicitly 
political" discourse of black consciousness with its 
"negation of the here-and-now" of apartheid and its 
concomitant "projection of a more optimistic alternative" 
fits comfortably into the parameters of "counter-discourse" 
as Terdirnan defines it in its earlier historical stages. 
While rerdiman's contention that counter-discourses accept 
the principle that the "dominant remains dominant" (73) may 
seem irrelevant to an examination of black consciousness as 
a specifically oppositional resistance movement, I would 
suggest that while the movement sought to undermine the meta­
discourse of apartheid, its objectives did not extend to the 
eradication of meta-discourse per se but rather, sought the 
establishment of a strongly antithetical discourse which 
, 
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would ultimately result in the synthesis of a new discourse 
based on inclusion rather than exclusion. 
Biko argues that the black consciousness movement was 
concerned, " ... in all fields, ... [to) talk to the black man in 
a language that (was] his own" ( 32) . The importance of 
claiming a particular language as one's own, of embodying or 
giving expression to, the "self" of the oppressed black 
person within a context of epistemic as well as physical 
victimization, is highlighted in the project of black 
consciousness as a discursive as well as a political strategy 
because the re-claiming of an identity is seen to be an 
important means of securing the conditions for real/political 
transformation. Transformation would only be possible once 
relations of power had been stabilised, but being equal, 
would precipitate inevitable and positive change. When Biko 
argues that even "the very political vocabulary that the 
blacks have used has been inherited from the liberals" (63), 
he asserts the need for a new, authentic political discourse 
which speaks the "selves" of specifically black people. At 
the centre of these claims to ownership of discourse and 
expression of the "self" is, of course, the fundamental need 
for the (re)construction and expression of an identity which 
had been consistently denied through the over-determination 
of apartheid. 
In the Foucauldian sense, the concept of discourse refers to 
a system of possibility for knowledge. Thus, to speak of 
black consciousness as a discourse is to invoke particular 
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ways of thinking about language, about truth, about power, 
and about the inter-relationships between all three within 
the context of social resistance practices. Truth becomes 
that which is accepted as such within the system of rules for 
a particular discourse, while power annexes, determines and 
verifies truth. Truth is thus never outside power, or devoid 
of power and the production of truth is thus a function of 
power. As Foucault claims, "we cannot exercise power except 
through the production of truth" ( 1977 12). Biko himself 
indicates an awareness of this need (while possibly 
conceiving of "truth" in a different way) when he argues 
that, 
Blacks are out to completely transform the system 
and make of it what they wish. Such a major 
undertaking can only be realised in an atmosphere 
where people are convinced of the truth inherent 
in their stand ... (49) 
The discourse of black consciousness is therefore grounded in 
a struggle for power. It is an attempt to re-claim some form 
of governance over truth-production mechanisms monopolized 
for decades by an apartheid propaganda machine. As Foucault 
expresses it: 
... discourse is not simply that which translates 
struggle or systems of domination, but is the thing for 
which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the 
power which is to be seized (cited in Young, ed. 1981 
52-53).
Discursive formations do not, however, exist in isolation 
from other discourses. They are not, as Ashcroft, Griffiths 
and Tiffin suggest, "hermetically sealed", but tend rather 
to, 
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overlap and intersperse in ways that· may be 
fruitfully and reflexively utilised. It is, after 
all, at the point of intersection with other 
discourses that any discourse becomes determined 
(1989 168), 
This overlap and interspersal, I would argue, is also true of 
discourses which are oppositional and which set themselves up 
as a challenge to dominant discourses. Applied to the 
"discursive event" of black consciousness, the comments made 
by Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin reveal the importance of 
understanding black consciousness as a discourse which not 
only exists in relation to other discourses, but is also one 
which exists, to a large extent, by virtue of other 
discourses. This is not an original assertion. It has as its 
precedent, among others, Wole Soyinka's critique of the 
racially-oriented discourse of negritude which, he argues, 
"took far too much colouring from European ideas even while 
its Messiahs pronounced themselves fanatically African .... " 
(127). Soyinka argues convincingly that negritude "accepted 
the dialectical structure of European ideological 
confrontation" (127) which involved the tacit acceptance of 
the supremacy of the white man as thesis. The synthesis 
offered by negritude does not, according to Soyinka, replace 
the antithetical inferiority of the African, but instead 
substitutes for it an extended definition of the term "highly 
developed" which embraces the intuitive as well as the 
analytical, without questioning the racist and binary 
("European compartmentalist intellectualism" ( 138)) 
presuppositions of the original premise (129). 
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Thus apartheid's position as a discursive determinant and as 
a point of reference for black consciousness opposition 
produces a relationship not unlike that perceived by Wole 
Soyinka between Negritude and European racism. This is not to 
suggest a denigration of the achievements of black 
consciousness as a significant movement in and of itself, but 
is instead, I would argue, an acknowledgement of the 
importance of the "material site of the text's production" 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin 168). In this regard, it could 
be argued that South Africa is unique in the development of 
a race-specific theory of identity which does not have its 
origin in diasporic or exiled conditions, Whereas Pan­
Africanism can be said to originate in Liberia and 
accompanies the return from slavery, and negritude can be 
seen as a reaction to assimilationism on the part of French 
West Africans living in Paris, South African blacks, while 
undoubtedly influenced by the theoretical writings of 
negri tudinists and pan-Africanists, were nevertheless 
responding directly to oppressive internal conditions within 
the boundaries of their own country. While it seems arguable 
that the feelings of alienation and exile induced by the 
apartheid state in its own inhabitants presents, in itself, 
a parallel with the origins of pan-Africanism and negritude, 
the existence of apartheid remains an important (and obvious) 
precipitative factor in the particular development of the 
black consciousness movement in South Africa. 
The material site of the text's production is given 
recognition by Terdiman's concept of counter-discourse. 
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Terdiman argues for the existence of certain "moments" or 
"spaces" within the multi-dimensional matrix of discourse 
formation, particularly within the "structural limitation of 
social control" ( 56) which allow for the emergence of 
oppositional discourses. Terdirnan argues that the most 
important function of dominant discourse is its capacity to 
"signify the dominant, to be recognised and exploited as 
such" ( 64) and thus is opened to "microinterventionist 
contestation, to functional disruption ... " (65). His theory 
offers insight into the dynamic and mutually-influencing, 
rather than passive, uni-directional relationship that 
existed in South Africa between official apartheid discourse 
and the black consciousness movement. A pertinent starting 
point in Terdiman's thesis is his modification (following 
Louis Helmsley) of Saussure's distinction between "langue" 
and "parole", by the introduction of the positive, concrete 
term, "usage 11 between them. He argues that "usage", 
... upsets the idea that language systems 
can usefully be split into a system on 
the one hand, and nonsystematic, somehow 
degraded or irrational manifestations on 
the other ... It projects not a private, 
unique act but a pattern active in 
community, a pre-established set of 
determinate possibilities and limits 
( 3 0) 
For Terdiman, as for Foucault, culture is· a "field of 
struggle". Social discourse, as it is conceived by Terdiman, 
is both an area for analysis and a site -of activism and 
potential transformation where the multi-accentuality of the 
sign suggests that "no discourse is ever a monologue .. , it 
always presupposes a horizon of competing, contrary 
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utterances against which it asserts its own energies" (36). 
Hence, discourses come into being in a "structure of counter­
discursive practices" so that the sign obtains its meaning in 
the context of conflict and contradiction rather than through 
simple assertion. Thus the construction of a particular 
discourse takes on a decidedly relational and contingent 
character. 
The function of counter-discourse, according to Terdiman, is 
"to disturb the easy reproduction and reception of dominant 
discourse". Thus, counter-discourse disrupts the ideological 
strategies which act to "universalize" the dominant and aims 
instead at building a consciousness of the contingent nature 
of the discursive formation. According to Terdiman, this 
would suggest, however, that a counter-discourse accepts {in 
a discrete way) the legitimacy of a dominant discourse. 
Terdiman argues that, 
... the counter-discourses which exploit such 
vulnerability implicitly evoke a principle of 
order just as systematic as that which sustains 
the discourses they seek to subvert (56). 
Terdiman cites Descombe in order to substantiate further his 
argument concerning the dependency of both the dominant and 
opposition groups (within a mutual context) on a mutual 
discourse: 
A dominant discourse is the imposition, not so 
much of certain truths ... as of a certain 
language ... which the opposition itself is obliged 
to employ to make its objections known (cited in 
Terdiman 62) . 
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Perhaps the best argument of this nature has been advanced by 
Jacques Derrida, by means of his analysis of how any moment 
of speech or manifestation is always necessarily involved 
with the discourse from which it would ostensibly make its 
difference felt. This argument relies on his use of 
Saussure's analysis of language, namely, that no sign is ever 
a positive term standing by itself, but rather, a negative 
sign -- negative in the sense of meaning only by virtue of 
being different and oppositional to another sign. Thus, 
Derrida's arguments have to use the words of metaphysics in 
order to undo metaphysics. The second point which develops 
from the first, is that no act of signification can start a 
priori without reference to an already inherited system of 
signs. In other words, there is no pure origin from which one 
can speak, uncontaminated by the necessary inherited field of 
difference which would make meaning possible in the first 
place. 
Derrida's argument has implications for a study of black 
consciousness as social discourse and the particular way in 
which the movement took up the challenge of opposition to 
apartheid. This requires an understanding of black 
consciousness as being not only a discourse in opposition to 
apartheid, but, necessarily, a discourse Qf. apartheid. This 
claim may seem politically insensitive or even absurd. 
However, my aim is not to discredit black consciousness, but 
rather to illustrate the necessarily structural components of 
black consciousness discourse -- these structural features 
having their particular reference points within apartheid, 
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with the understanding that apartheid in its most abstract 
sense, denotes a manifestation and imposition of a form of 
modernity. 
A theoretical excursion into the field of identity 
construction and an examination of the structural conditions 
out of which black consciousness developed will, I believe, 
necessarily point to the way in which "blackness" as a 
principle of a particular identity formation, as with any 
identitarian project, is accepted only to the extent that it 
is perceived, by those to whom it is directed, to be 'true', 
the parameters of such 'truth' being necessarily governed by 
historical imperatives. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Theorizing The Need For Identity 
South Africa, particularly in 
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its post-election 
circumstances, is not an isolated political entity, but is 
embedded in the matrix of a global politic al, social and 
economic system. South Africa too, has been significantly 
influenced by the end of the Cold War and the consequent 
denouement of broad global ideologies that have dominated the 
world political arena since 1945. Political theorist, Ernesto 
Laclau, argues that the oppositional discourses constituting 
the Cold war represented a "last version of the politic al 
ideology of modernity" and defines the "political ideology of 
modernity" as "the attempt to legitimate one's own ideology 
by presenting it as a fulfilment of a universal task 
(whatever that might be)" (1994:1). 
Today, in post-Cold War conditions, given the proliferation 
of particularistic political identities, he suggests that 
"[a]ny kind of universal grounding is contemplated with deep 
suspicion" ( 1). Laclau is circumspect, however, about leaving 
claims of this nature at such a level of simplification and 
therefore cautions against the assumption that the "crisis of 
universalism" means the effacement of the concept of 
universalism per se. Instead, the crisis of universalism 
refers, more accurately, to the "presence of its absence", an 
awareness of such "presence" leading to a consciousness of 
the complex, ambiguous and contingent ways in which all 
identity is constructed. Essentialist universalism, if 
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understood as a form of identity-claim itself, must of 
necessity, undergo a similar process of self-reflexive 
scrutiny regarding its own "constructed" nature (2). Once the 
transparency of social identities is questioned, however, the 
focus of analysis, according to Laclau, shifts from the 
recognition or discovery of identities to their 
(de)construction. The key term for understanding this process 
is the psychoanalytic {Lacanian) category of 
"identification", with its explicit assertion of a "lack" at 
the root of any identity, which means that one needs to 
identify with something, because of the existence of an 
originary and insurmountable lack of identity (3). 
A consequence of the distinction between identity and 
identification is the introduction of a constitutive split in 
all social identity. If the lack is constitutive, the act of 
identification that tries to fill it cannot have a source of 
justification external to itself, since the order with which 
we identify is accepted not because it is considered as 
valuable in terms of the criteria of goodness or rationality 
which operate at its bases, but because it brings about the 
possibility of an order, of a certain regularity an 
"identity". This is not to suggest, I believe, that the 
content of identity claims is irrelevant and does not have 
important political consequences, but that the need for an 
order/identity is necessarily primary. 
accordingly : 
Laclau explains it 
In a situation of radical disorganization, there 
is a need for an order, and its actual contents 
become a secondary consideration. This means that, 
between the ability of a certain 
principle of identification, 
contents of that order, there is 
( 3 ) 
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order to become a 
and the actual 
no necessary link 
Laclau's theory, I believe, effectively highlights the 
potential dangers which exist in cases where the need for 
order/identity in the context of social and political flux, 
is paramount and can thus create a situation whereby 
identity-manipulation and construction becomes a tool in the 
hands of politically-motivated ideologues. That the potential 
for this kind of scenario exists in South Africa, has been 
evidenced by the historical manipulation of racial and ethnic 
identities by apartheid and its agents in order to secure an 
effectively divided and thus, less organisationally 
resistant, social order. 
The tendency to exploit the need for a principle of 
identification, however, is not unique to those seeking power 
at the expense of subordinate groups, but is, I would argue, 
also a strategy for the construction of a counter­
identity/order by those seeking to challenge political and 
social domination, and to establish a more self-accommodating 
and self-reflecting order. One might argue then that the act 
of identification, or the need for some kind of resistance 
order by blacks has, in the history of South Africa, been 
governed by the same condition of an "originary and 
insurmountable lack of identity", which governed the 
imperatives of the process of forging a particular 
Afrikaans/white identity in South Africa at the expense of 
black identity. While the ethical dimensions of these 
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respective identitarian projects may be somewhat at odds, 
what remains of relevance in Laclau's argument is that the 
impetus towards identity construction is governed by a 
fundamental need for identity rather than because of some 
preconceived and universally recognised notion of the true 
nature of a peoples' inherent identity and an equally 
broadly-accepted notion of how it should be re-presented or 
expressed and that this need is often, if not always, 
expressed in relation to the perceived "other". Ralph 
Ellison's essay entitled "What America Would Be Like Without 
Blacks" demonstrates the practical force of Laclau's theory: 
Since the beginning of the nation, white Americans 
have suffered from a deep uncertainty as to who 
they really are. One of the ways that has been 
used to simplify the answer has been to seize upon 
the presence of black Americans and use them as a 
marker, a symbol of limits, a metaphor for the 
"outsider". Many whites could look at the social 
position of blacks and feel that colour formed an 
easy gauge for determining to what extent one was 
or was not American. Perhaps that is why one of 
the first epithets that many European immigrants 
learned when they got off the boat was the term 
"nigger" - it made them feel instantly American ... 
(1987 110-111) 
Ellison's comments, while directed specifically at American 
society, .nevertheless, effectively illustrate the essence of 
Laclau 's argument concerning the rather urgent need expressed 
by (all) societal groups, to assert a plausible and "stable" 
identity. Ellison's words reveal how the search for an 
identity is focused, however, not on extracting the essence 
of what it means to be "white", but instead, is focused on 
the search for an entity against which definition is 
possible. For American whites, then, American blacks 
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represent a category of comparability and a catalyst of the 
identitarian project, rather than an intrinsically-distinct 
"other". Thus identities become forged at the expense of 
other (perceived) identities. In applying this theory to 
Apartheid discourse in South Africa, Aletta Norval argues 
that "the moment of institution of discursive formations -­
such as that of apartheid -- always involves reference to the 
other" (121), Norval argues that this results in the 
establishment of a contradiction between the pretence to 
self-containedness and uncontamination by alterity on the one 
)
hand, and the fact that, on the other hand, the self ca��-:v
be constructed by the exclusion of the other. While one could 
argue that the "extreme identitary logic" which characterises 
apartheid's assertion of its self-sufficiency and 
independence applies equally to the separatist inclinations 
of black consciousness, I would suggest that black 
consciousness philosophy, formulated as it is from the 
position of the externalised, shows itself to be more 
receptive to the idea that the constitutive outside of any 
order has the capacity to put into question the very identity 
which is constituted through its externalisation (122). I 
would suggest that when Biko remarks that " ... the limits of 
tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they 
oppress" ( 90), he grants a degree of agency to the black 






identitarian orders and their "others". In this regard, Biko 
occupies a position very similar to that of Homi Bhabha who, 
with reference to Said 's Orientalism, comments that " ... there 
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is always in Said, the suggestion that the colonial power is 
possessed entirely by the coloniser". Such a suggestion is, 
Bhabha argues, both "an historical and [a] theoretical 
simplification" (cited in Young 1990 200). While Biko 
demonstrates an intelligent insight into the way in which 
identities emerge, I would argue that his particular 
conception of the black self presents limited possibilities 
for achieving the aims he envisages. 
"Authentic" versus Authenticated Identities 
... we cannot be conscious of ourselves and yet 
remain in bondage. We want to attain the 
envisioned self which is a free self (49). 
For Biko, the suppression of "true" consciousness has 
negative implications for the type of social order under 
which people live. By implication then, the expression of a 
"true", essential, self will inevitably result in the 
development of a just and egalitarian social order. The 
relationship depicted by black consciousness philosophy, 
between the assertion of a positive identity and the 
subsequent benefits of effective political action, 
emancipation and a new political culture, appears a confident 
one and is one that seems to invert the logic of Laclau's 
assertion that there is "no necessary link'' between the 
potential for a particular order to become a principle of 
identification, and the actual contents of that order. Biko's 
outlook suggests that the order he proposes will be accepted, 
not because it brings about the possibility of an/any order 
for blacks, but primarily because of the superior ethical 
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content of its identitarian basis -- for example, the fact 
that indigenous cultures embody "a lot of positive 
virtues, .. "(JO) from which the "Westerner" might benefit. It 
is the presentation of 
humanist value-system 
philosophy. 
a new, black-inspired, essentially 
that motivates much of Biko's 
The challenge that the programme of black consciousness 
mounts against the theoretical insights of Laclau's argument 
foregrounds the debate which exists between conceptions of a 
"racial" self, with an authentic, natural and stable identity 
and the anti-essentialist, pluralist conception of racial 
identities which views race itself as a social and cultural 
construction. Race theorist, Paul Gilroy, criticises the 
ontological essentialist position for its elitist stance in 
its attempt at the indoctrination of the mass of black people 
into "correct" cultural positions, and (of particular 
relevance) for the way in which its "overintegrated sense of 
cultural and ethnic particularity" tends to mask the 
"arbitrariness of its own political choices in 
charged language of ethnic absolutism" (31), 
the morally 
the latter 
comment giving credence to Laclau's notion of an order­
inspired rather than content-based identity. 
Despite hie admonitions regarding the weaknesses of the so­
called ontological essentialist position and its particular 
conception of nationality within black pol1tical discourse 
which he attributes (following on from the work of Martin 
Delany) to the "intellectual heritage of Euro-American 
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modernity", Gilroy also criticises the pluralist, libertarian 
perspective for failing to be sufficiently alive to "the 
lingering power of specifically racialised forms of power and 
subordination" (1993 32), a power, I would argue, which is 
particularly pertinent in an analysis of the South African 
context of racial domination and resistance. The interesting 
polemic which the debate outlined by Gilroy sets up -- a 
polemic which could be couched in terms of modern (western 
notions of identity, nationality and nationhood) versus 
postmodern (colour as an open signifier) identities, will be 
taken up more specifically in the context of the black 
consciousness movement in South Africa. 
Undoubtedly, deconstruction presents a particular challenge 
to the construction of identities based on race. Questions of 
whether blacks should become identical to whites in order to 
become recognised as equal, or whether blacks should assert 
their difference at the cost of equality, appear 
theoretically empty once essentialist identities are put into 
question. A common practice among critics of essentialism has 
been the abandonment of the category of the subject as a 
rational transparent entity, able to confer a homogenous 
meaning to the total field of her conduct by being the source 
of her action (Mouffe 1993 75). Psychoanalysis has suggested 
that, far from being organized around the transparency of an 
ego, personality is structured on a number of levels which 
lie outside the consciousness and rationality of the agents. 
This has been an incisive tool in undermining the idea of the 
unified character of the subject and has been an effective 
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counter-response to the rationalist conceptions of the 
subject which see the individual as a source of origin by 
virtue of his or her human-ness, 
While deconstruction reveals the impossibility of pure and 
complete essences, it never replaces essences. Instead it 
shows that, what appear to function as essences, are located 
in the terrain of contingency, rather than in the terrain of 
necessity. However, despite the difficulties involved in 
rationalising identity claims, the historical efficacy and 
powerful influence of the black consciousness movement in 
South Africa suggests that particular manifestations of 
identity claims cannot simply be dismissed and that despite 
the weight of the post-structuralist critique, there exists 
a need for a re-examination of the phenomenon. While 
deconstruction may reveal the historicity of identities, it 
does not mean their disappearance. Anna Marie Smith argues 
that, regardless of the power of deconstruction, claims to 
essences should not be dismissed but, rather, should be 
regarded as having important political effects, allowing for 
the self-naming and other-naming in the mapping out of 
antagonisms (173), Smith argues convincingly that claims to 
essences should always be placed within the context of 
particular strategies, such as the struggle against 
domination, rather than be considered in abstraction. Black 
consciousness offers an interesting opportunity to situate 




Race, Essence and Identity as "armour" in South Africa 
.In her examination of Rastafari as an essentialist resistance 
strategy against domination, Smith bases her definition of 
"essentialism" on the Aristotelian attempt to distinguish 
between form and matter. She observes that social practices 
within essentialist discourses tend to be shaped by a shared 
conception of social identity and that this identity tends to 
be considered as fixed, unique, undivided and ahistorical. 
"Essentialist" conceptions of identity claim that the 
"essence" or true character of an identity has been concealed 
by external forces of oppression and domination. The 
liberation of true identity, (both collectively and 
individually) is the highest goal of such philosophy and, 
like Plato's conception of the correlation between what the 
self is and the social order in which one exists, decision­
making is brought within the structure of identity 
construction (175-6). The rediscovery of "true" identity 
involves a rejection of dominant value systems, political and 
cultural practices in favour of the creation of new ones in 
keeping with the nature of the increasingly apparent "true" 
self. 
Smith argues further that, in creating an all-embracing 
framework for resistance to all kinds of oppression, 
Rastafari draws a single political frontier between the white 
racist system and the suffering black people (176). I would 
argue that black consciousness also operates in terms of a 
single frontier, understood in terms of a dichotomous 
division, which tends to simplify racial relations in terms 
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of an enemy (white)_/liberator (black) manichaeanism. Biko 
expresses the organisational logic of the struggle against 
apartheid in the following way:
It should ... be accepted that an analysis of our 
situation in terms of one's colour at once takes 
care of the greatest single determinant for 
political action - ie. colour ... (50). 
Racially oriented oppression in South Africa is thus 
countered by racially-oriented resistance. The potentially 
heterogeneous experiences of black oppression is 
strategically reinterpreted as a singular phenomenon, 
concerned with the articulation of blackness and suffering 
and the depiction of the white racist system as external and 
foreign to the values of blackness. The constitution of a 
specifically black identity tends to disallow a conception of 
identity as a matter of a complex play of heterogeneous 
subject positions, of which blackness exists as one among 
many, and instead, offers a totalizing identity which does 
not readily admit contradictory identities within blackness 
and which cannot strictly be interpreted as a strategic 
response to colonial oppression: 
One of the basic tenets of Black Consciousness is 
totality of involvement. This means that all 
blacks must sit as one big unit, and no 
fragmentation and distraction from the mainstream 
of events will be allowed (97). 
According to Smith then, the return to essence entails a 
thorough-going clarification of multiplicity and 
contradiction in experiences and identities, such that the 
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social becomes represented as a simple two-camp system (181). 
Biko expresses this dichotomy in the following way: 
We are oppressed not as individuals, not as Zulus, 
Xhosas, Vendas or Indians. We are oppressed 
because we are black. We must use that very 
concept to unite ourselves and to respond as a
cohesive group. We must cling to each other with a 
tenacity that will shock the perpetrators of evil 
(97). 
Here, the term "black" becomes an oppositional category, 
signifying "not white". The insistence on drawing into the 
fold "like-minded" "Coloureds" and Indians by the process of 
naming them as blacks, supports the idea that 'blackness' is 
defined by the movement as that which is not white. Indeed, 
those blacks who refused participation in the ethos of the 
movement were given the pejorative label of "non-white", the 
term commonly used by apartheid discourse to designate black. 
Blackness is thus defined against whiteness (which is 
synonymous with "evil" and exploitative values) and
demarcates a topology which fits comfortably into Smith's 
"two-camp" system, with the relevant camps being defined not 
only by the colour of its members' skins, but by their 
adherence, as oppressed, to an oppositional system of values 
to that of the oppressive and dominant {white) value system. 
While Biko may seem t9 broaden the area of his critique by 
questioning white value systems rather than white racist 
attitudes, I would argue that Biko conceives of a direct link 
between whiteness and exploitative values and in most cases, 
his critique of whites is synonymous with his critique of 
their mercenary value system which it seems must be accepted 
as an inevitable component of the package of being white. It 
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is on this basis that Biko rejects the attempts by so-called 
white liberals to foster "non-racial" relations with a view 
to engaging in non-racial struggle, arguing that white man's 
integration is "an integration based on exploitative 
values ... an integration in which black will compete with 
black, using each other as rungs up a step ladder leading 
them to white values ... " ( 91) . Biko argues that "whites in 
general reinforce each other" and that there "is no doubt 
that they do not question the validity of white values" (89). 
Thus the structural limitations Biko perceives which operate 
on particular racial groups within South Africa strongly 
reinforce the notion of a necessarily dichotomous struggle 
between black and white, each with mutually exclusive aims. 




towards simplification and 
would suggest that black 
consciousness discourse constituted an important interruption 
in the dominant discourse of South African colonialism. As a 
discourse, it allowed for the reintroduction of blackness as 
a positive term, into the misrepresentative and prejudicial 
language of apartheid. Black consciousness attempted to 
demonstrate that the displacement of stereotypical 
conceptions of blackness in favour of a more positive 
identity could only be accomplished through a rejection of 
the existing social order, an order dominated by 
universalizing white cultural values which are also 
"exploitative values" (91) and the positing of a form of 
radical humanism in its place. While it is true that, through 
its emphasis on integration, wholeness and sameness in the 
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black world, South African black consciousness philosophy 
contained within it the seeds of a universalizing antithesis 
to white supremacy and racism, I would argue that the attempt 
by blacks in South Africa to assume a positive identity in 
contradistinction to the negativity of their inscribed 
positions in colonial discourse can be usefully evaluated 
only by placing these identification strategies within the 
context of the fragmenting effects of racist discourse. 
The Lacanian term of identification whereby an image, 
reflected at a distance, on another surface, is accepted as 
a representation of the ego, not just because of its content, 
but more importantly, because of its fonn, not only offers an 
understanding of the constructed nature of identities, but 
also, importantly, a sense of the necessity for a bounded 
identity to serve as an "armour'' (4), precisely because of 
the fixity it offers. While revealing the alienating effects 
of identification which arise out of the fact that the image 
of the ego remains irreducibly other, such that 
identification is also at the same time mis-identification, 
Lacan's theory also shows that without a conception of the 
ego's identity as fixed, there could be no foundational 
reference for the 'I' which the subject has not yet spoken 
(197). Therefore, while the construction of identity always 
involves an idealization which always fails to secure the 
substantiality and permanence promised by the image, it is 
nevertheless, the only effective response to fragmentary 
effects of oppression. 
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Under conditions of radical disorganization and tyranny, the 
need for a coherent identity with which to mount a resistance 
and the anticipation of a fully formed, whole identity in the 
future, become considerations in any assessment of 
essentialist politics. Thus, in psychoanalytical terms, black 
consciousness can be understood as a discourse that allowed 
for an imaginary which could suggest a solution to the 
"representational bankruptcy" ( 198) of colonial discourse and 
provide a strategy offering some form of resistance to the 
neutralizing, marginalizing, fragmenting effects of racist 
discourse. 
W. E. B Du Bois' term, "double consciousness" describes the 
condition (experienced by racial minority groups) of being .in 
society (specifically Western society) but not of it. While 
regarding the condition as potentially liberatory, offering 
flexible options for individuals caught up in the dualities 
of double consciousness (expressed by Paul Gilroy as existing 
as "an index of increase and authentic doubling" (160)), Du 
Bois was also, according to Gilroy, at times aware of the 
negative possibilities embodied in the potential of a 
fragmented, split self. While addressing his theory, in the 
first instance, to blacks who found themselves to be minority 
groups within predominantly white/Western cultures, 
particularly that of British society, Du Bois's conception of 
double consciousness nevertheless has psychological resonance 
for South African blacks caught up in the alienating 
experience of apartheid. It provides a hermeneutically useful 
point of departure for a study of the "black self" of South 
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African apartheid. In South Africa, the claim made by blacks 
to belong (in opposition to the exclusionary discourse of 
apartheid), has been doubly legitimated by real, first-hand 
deprivations and injustices. A state of being "in society but 
not of it" could not easily be seen to be, in the South 
African case, an "index of increase and authentic doubling» 
as Gilroy understands the condition, primarily because of the 
weight of deprivation experienced and the real possibilities 
which existed for social change. In South Africa, the double 
consciousness condition may more aptly be applied to the 
predicament of being of society, but not in society -- an 
exclusion effected by apartheid legislation, depriving people 
of access to basic citizenship rights. Such a claim was made 
by a people deprived not only of a sense of belonging but 
who, in real terms, were denied access through statutory 
restrictions, to full social and political participation. In 
this particular context, the problem facing black South 
Africans appeared more susceptible to material analyses, to 
being understood as a political problem, potentially 
resolvable through political solutions. In view of the 
material problems and the directness of the experience of 
suffering associated with apartheid oppression, Biko's 
strategy, which adopts a more psycho-analytical stance 
towards the issue of psychological and cultural liberation, 
is a challenging one. 
Biko espoused the notion of psychological liberation as a 
means of achieving political change in a political climate 
which perceived political and material adjustments as pre-
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eminent. The movement's preoccupations were governed, to a 
large extent, by Biko's sensitivity towards the language of 
apartheid, the effects of semiotics on the ways in which 
societies are structured and individuals interpellated within 
various systems of societal/cultural production. While the 
black consciousness movement undoubtedly recognised the split 
in consciousness described by Du Bois, it was recognised, I 
believe, as a condition to be overcome rather than as either 
a potential or an immediate resource. In the South African 
context, double consciousness is observed, according to Biko, 
in the loss of manhood suffered by the black man who "twists 
his face in silent condemnation of white society" in the 
privacy of his toilet, but Hbrightens up in sheepish 
obedience ... to his master's impatient call"(28). 
The fact that the black man, in Biko's words, has "become a 
shell, a shadow of a man, completely defeated, drowning in 
his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression 
with sheepish timidity" (29) suggests that the aims of the 
black consciousness movement constitute an attempt to 
merge/unify the indi victual and national consciousness, rather 
than celebrate the creative potentialities of a divided 
individual or national sensibility. While the appeal to 
"blackness" as a motivational factor is relevant to both the 
theoretical positions of Gilroy/Du Bois and Biko, what the 
divergence between them indicates, is the degree of influence 
which political context has in determining the emphases of 
identitarian projects. The perception that "black culture is 
nothing but its politics", while bemoaned by Paul Gilroy 
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because of its implicit essentialism, does, however, also 
point to the pattern of historically impoverished positions 
in which blacks in many parts of the world have found 
themselves -- positions which have begged a politically­
oriented programme of action in order to overcome real 
oppression (as opposed to propagating cultural activism). 
Despite the cultural specificity of Gilroy's observations, 
one could argue that Gilroy's philosophy matches Biko's to 
the extent that both show a concern to transform the status 
of the "double consciousness" subject from that of victim to 
that of agent. Essentially, what Biko's movement offers is a 
strategy for emancipation, primarily of the psyche, from the 
clutches of white psychological (and physical) oppression. To 
this end, Biko attempted to provide a narrative of self­
creation and transformation for the victims of apartheid 
meta-discourse. 
While Gilroy seems to be sceptical of the notion of racially­
organised politics, he does however, make the important 
qualification that, while a political language based on 
racial identification is insufficient, it is however 
necessary. He suggests that what is needed is a middle path 
between the resoluteness of a therapeutic essentialism and 
the squeamishness of anti-essentialism which is complacent 
about the continuing effects of racism (1993 14). The 
ingredients he proposes are an anti-essentialism that 
involves "understanding that the radical contingency of 
racial identities does not diminish their power" ( 14). 
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Notwithstanding the problematic essentialism involved in 
black consciousness philosophy and other racial identity 
formations, the · following chapters will argue that the 
historical burden faced by blacks in South Africa and Africa 
more generally, reveals the need for acceptance of the fact 
that as theoretically unstable as racial identity formations 
may be, particularly when subjected to deconstructive 
scrutiny, they provide an important means of securing a 
footing in the treacherous terrain of colonial and post­
colonial relations. 
The Problems of a "Borrowed Tool" 
The adoption of the category of race as an organising 
principle towards disaffiliation, however, carries 
significant conseguences. Gilroy points to the difficulties 
of claiming an authentic, essential and independent position 
vis-a-vis the European oppressor when he argues that, 
[t)he understanding of race that we use almost without 
thinking, the ideas of nationality and culture with 
which we support it and the fundamental aspiration to 
freedom with which we orient our actions all derive from 
a history of ideas that has been integral to modern 
racial typology and white supremacy ... (1993 9). 
Gilroy's central thesis is that the intellectual heritage of 
Euro-American modernity "still determines the manner in which 
nationality is understood within black political discourse" 
(121). Thus identitarian projects, particularly those which 
promote racial imperatives, owing to the pervasive influence 
of modernity in all parts of the world, are necessarily 
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plagued by an intellectual debt to modernity and are forced 
to adopt borrowed conceptual implements: 
Our debts to that history are so extensive that debating 
the ultimate utility of the master's tools in 
dismantling the master's house is pointless, merely 
gestural. Even if we spurn his toolkit, the plans we 
need in order to complete the job of demolition without 
injuring ourselves in the process were produced 
according to his assurnptions ... (1993 8). 
For Gilroy, the influence of the west and its project of 
modernity is of such magnitude that any claim to 
"authenticity" made by identitarian groups in opposition to 
the west strikes a theoretically hollow note. By the same 
token, however, neither is the west in a position to claim, 
as Gilroy argues it does, that modernity or modern 
consciousness is the "exclusive property of the West" (156) 
or, as Steve Biko argues, "that whites are the divinely 
appointed pace-setters in progress" (24). Gilroy sees little 
sense in, or indeed possibility of, attempting an 
"independent" strategy of resistance. However the "first 
world" position from which, and about which, Gilroy speaks, 
allows for a measure of tolerance toward the "foreign" 
culture not easily matchable within a "third world" context. 
The problem of the struggle against racial oppression, by 
oppressed against oppressor, in a colonial situation, 
precisely because of the invasive, and in many cases brutal 
nature of colonisation, means that the strategies employed to 
challenge colonial authority, are inevitably ( and rather 
desperately)_ scrutinised with a view to establishing their 
authenticity. The psychology of oppression in many instances 
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dictates that the particular strategy chosen is, in itself, 
seen to constitute a means of challenging that oppression. 
Ashis Nandy, writing of colonial India, makes this point when 
he highlights the psychological consequences which invariably 
exist for those opponents of colonialism who allow themselves 
to participate with the coloniser on his/her own terms: 
... worse is the loss of one's "soul" and the 
internalization of one's victor, because it forces 
one to fight the victor according to the victor's 
values, within his model of dissent (111). 
Any fight within the model of the victor's dissent, according 
to Nandy, renders the dissenter an "acceptable" opponent, 
capable only of making "primary adjustments" to the colonial 
system. Thus Nandy offers a counter-view to that of Gilroy in 
the sense that he sees no possible benefit to be derived from 
the double-consciousness predicament because the 
psychological threat posed by colonialism, {to both colonised 
and colonizer), means that resistance can only be meaningful 
if grounded in the authenticity of difference and original 
cultural values. Nandy's focus is that of the cultural and 
psychological resistance strategies, which have helped Indian 
society survive the colonial experience, with "a minimal 
defensive redefinition of its selfhood" (xvi). While he 
concedes that the political economy of colonization is 
important, the real "crudity" and "inanity" of colonialism 
are expressed in the sphere of psychology (2), His concern 
therefore lies less with the overt and direct coercive 
methods and strategies employed by the coloniser than with 
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the "secondary psychological gains and losses from suffering 
and submission under colonialism" ( 3) . The ultimate violence 
of colonialism, according to Nandy, is that it creates a 
"culture in which the ruled are constantly tempted to fight 
their rulers within the psychological limits set by the 
latter". ( 3). The psychoanalytic tenn, of "identification with 
the aggressor" (an ego defence often used by a normal child 
in an environment of childhood dependency, to confront the 
inescapable dominance by physically more powerful adults with 
total legitimacy) aptly describes the colonial condition for 
Nandy, and sets up a binary opposition which he describes as 
an "unbreakable dyadic relationship". Nandy retrospectively 
describes the objectives of his study: 
I started with the proposition that colonialism is 
first of all a matter of consciousness and needs 
to be defeated ultimately in the minds of men ... I 
have also, I hope, shown that the liberation 
ultimately had to begin from the colonized and end 
with the colonizers (63). 
By focusing on the psychological rather than the organised 
aspects of colonialism, Nandy shares many of the concerns 
that Biko articulates through his philosophy of black 
consciousness. Biko shows an understanding of the importance 
of consciousness in the struggle for liberation when he 
argues that at the heart of black consciousness thinking is 
"the realisation by blacks that the most potent weapon in the 
hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed" (92). 
Biko echoes Nandy's concerns about the real potential for co­
optation when he writes that, 
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... the major danger that I see facing the black 
community ... ( is J ••• to be so conditioned by the 
system as to make even our most well-considered 
resistance to fit within the system both in terms 
of the means and of the goals (36). 
Central to Nandy's thesis is an understanding of the 
indivisibility of freedom that neither colonised nor 
coloniser can escape the detrimental effects of colonialism 
which propagates a culture or logic of oppression. Nandy thus 
debunks the myth which suggests that the colonised are the 
only victims in the colonial relationship, arguing that this 
is a view which is propagated by the coloniser who has an 
interest in downplaying the degradation that he/she undergoes 
concomitantly. This process of degradation is referred to by 
Cesaire as the "decivilization of the colonizers": 
The coloniser, who in order to ease his conscience, gets 
into the habit of seeing the other man as an animal, 
accustoms himself to treating him like an animal and 
tends objectively to transform himself into an animal ... 
( 1972 20). 
Nandy's important point is that both colonised and coloniser 
are co-victims in a system of oppression and exploitation. 
Nandy names this system "imperialism" which, he argues, is 
constructed on the basis of a dichotomy between winners and 
losers. A recognition of the falsity of such dichotomy, 
therefore, signals the demise of either an ethical or 
cognitive basis of justification for imperialism (100). For 
Biko, the system of oppression is a "strong white racism" 
(90) which, he concedes, is not as selective in who it names
as its victims as is commonly believed, Speaking of the 
arrogance of white liberals who unproblematically deny 
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complicity in the divisive structures of apartheid, Biko
argues the need for a more honest reflection by liberals of 
their oppression and their discursive position: 
The liberal must fight on his own and for himself. 
If they are truly liberals they must realise that 
they themselves are oppressed, and that they must 
fight for their own freedom and not that of the 
nebulous "they" with whom they can hardly claim 
identification (66). 
Biko's quest to bestow on South Africa the "greatest gift 
possible - a more human face" ( 98) speaks of a radical 
humanism based on what he terms "African cultural concepts" 
which he hopes will i:-eplace the (essentially "white") "Coca­
Cola and hamburger-eating" culture. threatening to engulf 
South Africa. Biko relies on what he believes are authentic 
traditional attributes, (which despite adversity, have 
remained with black culture to the present day) in order to 
effect this transformation and in so doing, I would suggest 
that Biko exhibits a tendency to absolutise relative 
differences between what he calls white culture and African 
culture. This is most clearly pronounced in his discussion of 
African cultural concepts. 
Biko argues that whereas African culture was "unsophisticated 
and simple", "Anglo-Boer" culture was "the more powerful 
culture in almost all facets" (41). For Biko, black culture 
is "man-centred", communal, and conversational, while white 
culture is individualistic, utilitarian and competitive. 
African culture believes in the inherent goodness of man 
while white culture is inherently suspicious of its fellows 
(42). Black culture is prepared to sacrifice technological 
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progress for human development while white culture, embodying 
the individualistic "capitalist approach" does not refrain 
from using people as "stepping stones" (42). The African is 
characterised, according to Biko, by a "love for song and 
rhythm" ( 42) which builds togetherness and tenacity, enabling 
the African to continue "for hours on end" at a particular 
task. African culture embraces sharing and cooperation and is 
unfamiliar with the concept poverty, except in conditions of 
climactic adversity (43). The African's approach to problem 
solving is not, like that of the Westerner, based on 
aggressive scientific analysis and reason, but instead, rests 
on an approach of "situation-experiencing" (42). The 
African's response to a problem allows for contradiction and 
ambiguity to be embraced without this being perceived as 
defeatist as it constitutes a response of the "total 
personality" of the African. These, it is implied, are the 
cultural traits "which have been able to withstand the 
process of deliberate bastardization" and of which African 
culture can in the present day boast (45). Africans according 
to Biko, occupy a position which is closer to nature than 
their western counterparts and have not yet paid the price, 
as has white culture, for "cutting out the dimension of the 
spiritual" (46) in favour of "perfecting their technological 
know-how" ( 4 7) . 
On the basis of these cultural oppositions, Biko might be 
accused of a lack of commitment to breaking out of the 
topological binarisms of apartheid or the "Manichaean 
aesthetic" of post-colonial societies, an aesthetic which 
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expresses the binary divisions of centre-margin, self-other, 
good-evil, black-white. What Biko tends to do instead, is to 
offer a competing theory of universalising stereotypes. The 
recovery of indigenous culture which Biko attempts, with its 
focus on traditional symbolism and images, can be understood 
as an attempt to substitute categories of colonialism with 
positive elements rather than replace them with new patterns 
and as such, constitutes a counter-myth against the similarly 
mythologising and stereotyping technigues of colonialism. The 
process of recovery, is however, a selective one. While 
selecting for retrieval the attributes of communalism and 
"man-centred" living, Biko's intention is not historical or 
anthropological accuracy as this would demand an 
acknowledgement of the hierarchical structures on which many 
African societies have been, and still are, organised. 
However, Biko's disillusion with what he perceives as the 
negativity of Western individualism and "white" values 
initiates a process of identity construction which is 
essentially a relational one. Biko's identitarian project, 
despite its apparent scepticism of the west and its cultural 
values, also reveals an identification with critical moments 
in western culture. Biko's critique of the west sounds a 
strikingly similar note to Romanticism's critique of 
modernity. The black consciousness movement, certainly 
through the expressions of Biko, is seen to react against the 
same things in western culture that Romanticism reacted 
against, such as the cold rationalism and the over-whelming 
industrialism which accompanied modernity.2
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Modernity versus Itself 
Ernesto Laclau's understanding of the "political ideology of 
modernity", as "the attempt to legitimate one's own ideology 
by presenting it as a fulfilment of a universal task 
(whatever that might be)" captures the thrust of uniformity 
and homogeneity which accompanied much modern political 
thinking. Contextualising the South African experience within 
this framework allows for the opportunity of conceptualizing 
apartheid as a modern political ideology, caught up in the 
implementation of the "universal task" of maintaining racial 
purity and economic superiority through rigid racial 
segregation and the authoritarian imposition of an "ideal" 
order/hierarchy. Black consciousness, responding as a 
challenge to apartheid, is nevertheless informed by similar 
modern imperatives both being racially-organized 
ideologies, seeking a guaranteed position for the "self" of 
their respective constituencies, in the social order. For 
Zygmunt Bauman, it is the recognition of the essential 
artificiality of the social order and the inability of 
society to attain an orderly existence on its own (against 
Aristotle) that constitutes the defining moment of modernity 
(1991 99). This particular view of modernity allows for the 
objective legitimation of all forms of political/social 
struggle, but at the same time, invites conflict over issues 
of which claims to "order" are stronger. What this amounts 
to in South Africa and other colonial situations, is an 
expression of (apartheid) order at the expense of the (black) 
other and an expressed need by such an "other" for 
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reassertion. Elleke Boehmer expresses this as, ultimately, a 
discursive struggle over language and meaning: 
Colonialism was not different from other kinds of 
authority, religious or political, in claiming a 
monopoly on definitions in order to control a 
diverse, unstable reality ... dominance was gained 
first by the constant incorporation and 
suppression of difference, and then also by a 
vigorous reiteration of authoritative meanings 
(1995 167). 
Thus an important strategy in this order-creating project is
the naming of people through language which contributes to 
the restoration and maintenance of order and the 
establishment of a system of categories. The concept of 
"ambivalence'', however, according to Zygmunt Bauman, 
describes the "possibility of assigning an object or an event 
to more than one category" and is thus a direct threat to 
such systematic categorization. Ambivalence constitutes a 
disorder and thus, a "failure of the naming (segregating) 
function that language is meant to perform" ( 1) . Language 
then strives to sustain the order with which we are familiar 
and to deny or suppress randomness and contingency. Thus the 
naming/classifying function of language has the prevention of 
ambivalence as its purpose. 
The classifying effort is, importantly (and in the same way 
that nationhood was conceived earlier), constituted by acts 
of inclusion and exclusion. Each act of naming (ordering) 
splits the world into two: entities that answer to the "name" 
and those that do not. Essentially, such naming is an act of 
violence and requires the support of coercion. Bauman' s 
analysis perceives that violence is endemic to the process of 
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order, and I would argue that Derrida's concept of epistemic 
violence contained in the "Battle of Proper Names" has a 
similar theme. Derrida claims that, 
[a]nterior to the possibility of violence in the
current and derivative sense, the sense used in
[Levi-Strauss's) "A Writing Lesson", there is as
the space of its possibility, the violence of the
arche-writing, the violence of difference, of
classification, and of the system of appellations"
(1976 110).
The quotation needs to be understood within the context of 
the "dialogue" between Derrida and Levi-Strauss over the 
issue of writing. While writing for Levi-Strauss is an 
instrument of oppression, a means of colonizing and its 
acquisition signifying the loss of innocence, Derrida sees 
"writing", in the narrowly defined sense in which it is used 
by Levi-Strauss, as a merely derivative activity which always 
supervenes on a culture which is always already "written" 
through the forms of its social existence. These forms 
include codes of naming, rank, kinship and other forms of 
societal restraint/hierarchies. According to Bauman, in 
modern society, (characterised by a technological and 
management-based approach to ambivalence control), these 
restrictive "forms" of social existence, which Derrida 
identifies, are integral to the "fight of determination 
against ambiguity, of semantic precision against ambivalence" 
(4). Thus the apartheid state, with its rigid racial 
categorisation and segregationist policies constitutes an 
exemplary moment in modernity's struggle for order. However, 
because the struggle is not, according to Bauman, a fight of 
"one definition against another" or "one way of articulating 
page 48 
reality against a competitive proposal" (4-5), I would argue 
that the "uncertainty" and "indef inability" which 
characterises the "other of order" is not applicable to the 
black consciousness movement which attempts its own 
clarification of "fuzziness" and "obscurity". Bauman is 
categorical in his belief that the "other of order" is not 
another order -- chaos is its only alternative (5). 
Bauman's typology thus places the black consciousness 
movement outside the category of the "other of order". If 
''friends" control the classification and the assignment, the 
opposition, "enemies" are the product and the condition of 
the friends' narrative domination, of the friends' narrative 
as domination. As far as they dominate the narration, set its 
vocabulary and fill it with meaning, friends are truly at 
home, among friends, at ease (53). Thus the friend/enemy 
opposition acts to make the world readable (54). It is a 
characteristic of strangers, as embodiments of ambivalence, 
that they question not just this one opposition here and now, 
but oppositions as such, the principle of opposition and the 
plausibility of the dichotomy it suggests and the feasibility 
of separation it demands (58-59). The presence of the 
stranger, then is a challenge to the reliability of orthodox 
landmarks and the universal tools of order-making. Black 
consciousness does not represent this kind of disturbance 
because it does not radically challenge the boundaries of 
same and other, but to a certain extent, relies upon them. 
Despite the aim of the black consciousness movement as 
expressed by Biko, to "overhaul the whole system in South 
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Africa" (64) and despite Biko's recognition that the greatest 
danger facing black communities in South Africa is "to be so 
conditioned by the system as to make even our most well­
considered resistance to fit within the system both in terms 
of the means and of the ends" ( 36), Biko's conception of 
identity allows little room for ambiguous or multiple social 
identities. 
In summary, I would argue that the imperatives of modernity, 
such as the "naming" functions of 1 anguage, work as a 
classificatory/segregationist/fragmentationist project 
designed to perpetuate order, but which is, of necessity, 
also always caught up in the battle against ambiguity and 
disorder, thus perpetuating the order/disorder, 
insider/outsider, friend/enemy oppositions. I would argue 
that the black consciousness movement's relationship with the 
white apartheid state falls within this friend/enemy topology 
because, unlike the category of "the stranger", which cannot 
be included within philosophical (binary) opposition and 
which resists and disorganises it without ever, in Derrida's 
terms, "cons ti tu ting a third term" or without ever leaving 
room for a solution in the form of "speculative dialectics" 
(19B1 71), the black consciousness movement, while 
questioning some oppositions, does not question the principle 
of oppositions as such. 
Terry Eagleton places the "impossible irony" of the friend 
and the enemy being two sides of the same coin in perspective 
when he argues that, 
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the politics of difference or specificity is, in 
the first place, in the cause of sameness and 
universal identity the right of a group 
victimised in its particularity to be on equal 
terms with others as far as their self­
determination is concerned. This is the kernel of 
truth of the Bourgeois Enlightenment: the abstract 
universal right of all to be free, the shared 
essence or identity of all human subjects to be 
autonomous (1988 15). 
Eagleton's argument is an attractive one. He argues that 
categories such as race, class, gender, which have been 
consistently used in identitarian struggles for recognition 
and equality, while being "ontologically empty" and 
necessarily caught up in the "metaphysical categories" they 
hope to finally abolish, are nevertheless, important and 
necessary means by which to plot a chart towards freedom 
which goes, not around difference, but "all the way through 
it and out the other side" (10). Eagleton's argument is that 
the project of emancipatory politics is "doubly disabled" in 
that if it seeks to evolve its own discourse of place, body 
inheritance, sensuous need, it will find itself "miming the 
cultural forms of its opponents". However, if it does not do 
so, it will, 
appear bereft of a body, marooned with a purely 
rationalist politics which has cut loose from the 
intimate affective depths of the poetic (16). 
Eagleton argues that collective identities are "importantly 
negative" in the sense that the members of such collectives 
share a common oppression. He suggests, however, that this 
negativity, based as it is on the realisation of a need for 
change, has the potential to become positive. However, owing 
to the oppressive conditions under which such battles are 
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fought, political gain will never be unambiguous and will 
always be, to some extent "collusive with its antagonists" 
and this, according to Eagleton is the predicament which 




Black Consciousness and the Possibilities for a New Humanism 
In The Wretched of the Earth, Franz Fanon writes of 
decolonization that it, 
... sets out to change the order of the world, 
{and] is obviously a program of complete 
disorder ... Decolonization is the meeting of two 
forces opposed to each other by their very nature, 
which in fact owe their originality to that sort 
of substantification which results from and is 
nourished by the situation in the colonies (27-
2 8) 
Fanon's suggestion is that the relationship between the state 
and the Algerian people has been rendered dialectical by the 
exigencies of the liberation struggle. However, the synthesis 
at times offers little more than a reversal: 
In decolonization, there is , there fore the need 
for a complete calling in question of the colonial 
situation. If we wish to describe it precisely, we 
might find it in the well-known words: "The last 
shall be first and the first last". Decolonization 
is the putting into practice of this sentence 
( 2 8) 
Fanon's description of the decolonizing process as a 
"murderous and decisive struggle between two protagonists" 
effectively echoes Bauman's friend/enemy dichotomy and lends 
further support to the idea that the decolonization process 
involves not the disruption of order-seeking projects, but 
rather, the contestation of their content. However, while the 
oppositional counter-narrative is characterized by reversals, 
inversions and binaries (the danger existing that such 
efforts remain inscribed within the very logic that 
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dehumanizes them), I would suggest that the positing of black 
"positive" images against white supremacist stereotypical 
images, may be understood as an attempt at a re-presentation 
of monolithic and homogeneous black communities in a way that 
would displace historical representations of these 
communities (West, October, 103). While the potential exists 
for the mimicking of a European universalism and humanism, I 
would suggest that, as a gesture towards postcolonialism, it 
is possible to appropriate and incorporate concepts such as 
"universalism" and "humanism" and still reform them to the 
extent that they take on new significance and relevance in a 
postcolonial context. Neil Lazarus, for example, argues that 
in concluding The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon is able to 
proclaim a "new" humanism by formally repudiating the 
degraded European version: 
Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of 
Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them ... When I 
search for Man in the technique and style of Europe, I 
see only a succession of negations of man ... For Europe, 
for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must turn 
over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try 
to set afoot a hew man (1968 311-12,316). 
The optimism that Fanon demonstrates in the possibility of 
the creation of a "new man" is shared in Biko's "quest for a 
true humanity": 
We have set out on a quest for true humanity, and 
somewhere on the distant horizon we can see the 
glittering prize ... In time we shall be in a position to 
bestow upon South Africa the greatest gift possible -­
a more human face (98). 
In striving for this goal, Biko relies heavily on the 
strength of a communal identity derived from "our common 
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plight and our brotherhood" ( ibid) and in so doing, reaffirms 
his commitment to an essentialist conception of black 
identity -- one which declaims Ernesto Laclau's thesis which 
argues that in situations of potential disorganisation, the 
need for order is necessarily more important than the content 
of that order. Biko's adherence to the notion of a common 
brotherhood which, to a large extent, informs the type of 
dispensation achieved, is challenged by Corne! West on the 
grounds that this form of identity re-presentation, involves 
the assumption that it is possible firstly, to gain access to 
the "real black community" and secondly, to achieve an 
understanding of what "positive (black) images" really are. 
West argues that notions of the "real black community" and 
� -, bu1 ? 
"positive images" are innocent •:r value-laden, socially 
1! /1 
loaded and ideologically charged and, following Stuart Hall, 
West argues for the need for a recognition that "black" is a 
politically and culturally constructed category (104). He 
calls for an investigation of the alternative existing beyond 
the opposition of blackness/whiteness -- an "other" based on 
the recognition of the profoundly hybrid character of the 
category of "race" and which, on the basis of this 
recognition, seeks to traverse forms of conventional binaries 
( 105) 
Corne! West's reservations concerning what I would term the 
postcolonial possibilities for identitarian discourse are 
further elucidated by Abiola Irele's discussion of the 
concept of negritude in his essay entitled "What Is 
Negritude", which reveals many similarities between negritude 
page 55 
and black consciousness. Irele speaks of negritude as a 
"counter-myth", juxtaposed against the ideological rationale 
of Western imperialism. The belief, embraced by negritudinist 
thinking, that each race is "endowed with a distinctive 
nature and embodies, in its civilization, a particular 
spirit" (1981 70), is not without similarities to the racist 
doctrines propagated in Europe which used the same argument 
to justify elevation of white over black. There exists, 
therefore a degree of epistemological entrapment of African 
identitarian movements within the colonial episteme. While 
obviously similar, however, negritude does involve certain 
modifications vis-a-vis western racial philosophies. Irele 
claims that for Leopold Senghor, largely recognised as a 
founder of the negritudinist movement, Negritude does not 
"consist in a systematic rejection of Western racist 
theories, but instead, constitutes a "modification of the 
terms in which they are set out, and in a redefinition of the 
very notion of race" (71). Thus Irele concludes: 
Senghor' s conception of the black man contains 
important elements taken over from these theories, 
but in his system, they are given a new 
perspective. Thus while accepting the objective 
reality of race as indicative of a specific inner 
identity and aptitude, Senghor rejects the idea 
that the black man is inferior in his human 
quality to the white man (71). 
What Senghor seems to stress, therefore, is that a difference 
lies in the ethical content of the racialism adopted. Kwarne 
Anthony Appiah' s distinction between intrinsic racism and 
extrinsic racism which, he argues, is important for 
understanding the character of contemporary pan-Africanism 
(1992 17), has relevance for an understanding of this ethical 
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difference. While both intrinsic and extrinsic racists 
differentiate morally between members of different races, the 
extrinsic racist will do so on the basis of a "cognitive 
incapacity" or refusal to accept evidence for the equal moral 
status of other races, while the intrinsic racist holds that 
the mere fact of being of the same race is reason for 
preferring one person to another and is thus impermeable to 
evidence which attests to the moral capabilities of another 
race ( 14-15). Appiah goes on to argue that there is a 
"significant pattern in the rhetoric of modern racism", which 
reveals that the "discourse of racial solidarity is usually 
expressed through the language of intrinsic racism, while 
those who have used race as the basis for oppression and 
hatred ( as have South African whites), have appealed to 
extrinsic racist ideas" (17)3 • Thus it seems for Appiah that 
it is the '' fact of a shared race" rather than a "shared 
racial character" (ibid) that provides a more accurate basis 
for political solidarity based on race. 
According to Irele, criticisms of (Senghor's) negritude fall 
into two categories which relate firstly to its theoretical 
paradigms and secondly, to its practical implications. On the 
first level, Senghor' s attribution of a racial basis to 
mental processes is accused of being simplistic, general and 
unscientific. Senghor's emphasis on the mystical and 
religious qualities of African-ness is considered ahistorical 
in light of the argument that all traditional societies, not 
merely those in Africa, are situated in close relation to the 
natural environment over which they have little rational 
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control. This lack of mastery then justifies a recourse to 
the mystical and supernatural. The idea of a unified African 
culture, emanating from an African essence which is constant 
also eschews the transformational powers of historical 
evolution (Irele 84). 
Regarding the second level of criticism based on practical 
shortcomings, Senghor' s Negritude has been accused of lacking 
content in that it does not offer the possibility of 
meaningful and transformatory social action in the present 
and, I would argue, the future. Its recourse to the values of 
the past has the potential of casting Negritude in a 
conservative framework which is at odds with the exigencies 
of the present. Its emphasis on spirituality suggests a 
neglect of socio-economic and technological realities, and 
has the potential to act as a method of detraction from 
immediate practical tasks in favour of the protection of 
ruling elite interests. 
While Irele concedes the partial validity of these 
criticisms, he argues that what is neglected in many of these 
attacks is an examination of the historical conditions and 
political imperatives out of which Negritude emerged and I 
believe that the same can be argued for the South African 
black consciousness movement. Such an oversight tends to 
lead, accordingly, to a failure to understand, in Irele's 
words, that, 
what really counts here is the need felt by the 
deprived group for a sustaining vision of the 
collective self and of its destiny ... The 
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historical connections of Negritude with the 
various movements involved in black nationalism 
since the nineteenth century in particular show 
that it forms part of an on-going process of self­
reflection by the black man ... (B5). 
In appealing for a recognition of the importance of an 
historical understanding of positions like that of Senghor' s, 
Irele thus modifies Senghor's non-relativist, essentialist 
view of racial identity construction by showing how 
identities are established in a relational way -- that one 
defines oneself against that which one is not. Irele thus 
reveals the potential for an understanding of identity 
construction as a synthetic and a heuristic process, and as 
a complex response to an equally complex colonial situation, 
rather than as a simple process of uncovering or rediscovery, 
of an essential self (both collective and individual), This 
is not to suggest that response to European hegemony in the 
form of African identity assertion has been just that -­
merely and only a response to colonization and thus a direct 
product of that colonization, but rather, points to the 
necessity of a contextual understanding of the need for 
identity re-evaluation and assertion and its particular 
manifestations. This understanding, I would argue, is also 
crucial to a conception of black consciousness in South 
Africa. C.R.D Halisi writing on "Biko and Black Consciousness 
Philosophy: An Interpretation", argues that black 
consciousness, informed by a "distinct generational 
perspective" (1991 101) marked a need by younger black South 
Africans, who were "compelled by circumstances to rethink the 
very meaning of politics in the South African struggle" 
( 100). It follows then that Irele' s appeal for a greater 
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contextual understanding of identitarian projects is well­
founded in the case of the South African black consciousness 
movement where the creation of a new and truly humanist 
value-system had its origins in an inconsistent application 
of Western humanitarian value systems. 
The video, Biko: The Spirit Lives, screened on NNTV during 
June, 1995, features extracts of an interview with Steve Biko 
in which he suggests that the objectives of black 
consciousness are closely related to a particular kind of 
value system. Biko remarks that the aim of black 
consciousness is, 
... for the black man to elevate his own position 
by positively looking at those value systems that 
make him distinctively a man in society ... 
A correct consciousness, therefore -- one that permits the 
"black man" to operate as a fully-constituted "man in 
society" is dependent on a similarly correct and 
complementary value system. Biko's comment also announces an 
allegiance to a conception of the modern, individual man, 
conducting an active search for a place in society which will 
secure for him the necessary rights, dignity and 
psychological support needed to engender a fully-constituted 
black man, but. also, more generally, a fully-constituted 
"citizen" within the framework of the nation-state. When Biko 
claims that the "type of black man we have today has lost his 
manhood", and that he is "reduced to an obliging shell" ( 28), 
he is referring, on the face of things, to the loss of agency 
of the black person in the face of an all pervasive, white-
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inspired domination called apartheid. What can be discerned 
on a more discrete level, however, but nevertheless quite 
consistently, is the prevalence in the discourse Biko 
presents, of the idea of "manhood" and masculinity in the 
self-definition of the black man and the problem that 
apartheid presents for the playing out of a particularly 
"male" role in society. If one accepts the signifying power 
of language to shape power relations in societal contexts, 
Biko's "male-speak" and his notable silence on the issue of 
gender oppression, constitutes a significant and defining 
feature of the black consciousness movement as a whole, and 
demonstrates the limitations of the movement as a liberatory 
project in that it addressed only particular manifestations 
of oppression. 
The observation made by Mamphela Ramphele, one of the few 
active early female members of the black consciousness 
student organisation, SASO, founded by Biko at the University 
of Natal Medical School, that women "were ... involved in the 
movement because they were black" and that " [ g )ender as a 
political issue was not raised at all" (cited in Pityana et 
al Ed. 1991 215) is indicative of a degree of real 
heterogeneity within the black community and an inescapable 
differentiation of the black subject which the black 
consciousness movement, through the adoption of its master­
narrative of race, tended to ignore. She argues further that 
women were viewed as important only to the extent that they 
were involved as "wives, mothers, girlfriends and 
sisters, ... fighting a common struggle against a common enemy 
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- namely, white racism. Scant regard was given to their
positions as individuals in their own right" (216). The few 
women, such as Ramphele, who did succeed in elevating 
themselves to positions of leadership, had to do so in their 
capacity as "honorary men" and were thus forced to become 
''tough, arrogant and assertive", often at the expense of 
empathy with women fulfilling more "traditional" roles in 
society and within the university. 
This observation has interesting implications for claims that 
black consciousness represented in some ways, a re-invention 
of ''traditional" values. Women, in order to partake of the 
liberatory function of the black consciousness movement, were 
forced to act in ways which could be considered decidedly 
"non-traditional" from the perspective of Africanist 
patriarchal discourse. Furthermore, there is a significant 
tension within black consciousness discourse which asserts 
that the "white" oppressors could not and should not be 
contested on their own "white" competitive standards while 
this discourse simultaneously expects its female participants 
to assimilate the codes and conventions of male discourse. 
Ramphele argues in a similar vein to that of Irele, that 
"[o]ne has to judge black consciousness male activists as 
products of their environment" (219), and that part of the 
ease with which men's superior status remained unchallenged 
was owing to the fact that many of the women themselves had 
a great deal of respect for 'tradition' and traditional roles 
which acknowledged the primacy of the man in the 
"patriarchal 1 patrilineal and patrilocal 
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system that 
underpins most gender relations in South Africa" (224). While 
this explanation is undoubtedly accurate, I would argue that 
the attitude of black consciousness followers towards women 
goes beyond having an influence on the particular terminology 
used to express ideas. As a male-centred grouping, it was 
caught between the scope of a traditional societal structure 
which placed value on the position of men as leaders and 
initiators and the imperatives of a modern conception of a 
humanist social order which demanded the extension of the 
rights of citizenship and equality to all. 
The emphasis on agency and the role of the man/citizen in 
society characteristic of black consciousness thinking, is 
reiterated by Peter Jones, when he remarks that black 
consciousness, 
opened up the way that people saw themselves, the 
way they saw their role within the world.4 
Integral to both the comments of Jones and Biko is the notion 
of a definitive relationship between self and society. Biko 
indicates that self-appraisal can only be achieved through 
simultaneously looking at the role that "self" plays within 
society and the value systems which govern the nature of that 
society. Jones's comment, containing as it does, echoes of an 
Hegelian idealism, similarly lays stress on the idea that a 
people's conception of themselves is closely tied up with the 
way the world is perceived by it. Suggestions of a 
definitive, ontological link between self and society, 
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however, are complicated by Biko's suggestion of the need for 
critical choices in the process of self-definition: 
The first method for our own liberation is self­
conception. Black people have reached a hybrid bridge 
where they do not even know whether they should define 
themselves in terms of what they are or in terms of what 
they desire to be. Theirs is the great weight (interview 
extract). 
The comment gives weight to the adulterating effects of 
colonial culture on the minds and being of black South 
Africans. It offers an image of intense psycho-cultural 
breakdown. However, Biko's reliance on the past, his belief 
in the benefits involved in uncovering a history of heroic 
resistance is offset to some extent, by the suggestion 
contained in the above comment that conceptualisation of the 
self cannot take place only on the basis of retrospective 
thinking. The need for some form of conceptualisation on the 
basis of desired cultural attributes and societal value 
systems is implied in the suggestion that self-
conceptualisation cannot be regarded as a given. This 
ambiguity allows for a conceptualisation of identitarian 
projects as involving some degree of construction and not 
merely retrieval ( an Ireleian revision of a potentially 
essentialist, non-relative position). To some extent, this is 
conceptualised in Biko's chapter in I Write What I Like 
entitled, "The Quest for a True Humanity", where he moves 
explicitly away from an essentialist conception of race and 
racial identity towards an astute political understanding 
when he says that "we have to find out whether our position 
is a deliberate creation of God or an artificial fabrication 
of the truth by power-hungry people whose motive is 
page 64 
authority, security, wealth and comfort" {87). Biko's 
conception of the origins of racial oppression is quite 
clearly the latter. This is confirmed when he argues that 
there "is no doubt that the colour question in South African 
politics was originally introduced for economic reasons" (87-
88) 
Tony Morphet has suggested the existence of "four 
intellectual moments" in the Durban academic milieu during 
the period 1970-74. These moments, according to Morphet 
signalled unique possibilities for upsetting the oppressive 
course of history in South Africa. Initiators of these 
"moments" include -- among others such as Dunbar Moodie and 
Mike Kirkwood -- Richard Turner (working on The Eye of the 
Needle) and Stephen Biko, who was formulating the 
"intellectual core, political discourse and practical 
programme of Black Consciousness" (Morphet 1990 88). 
Morphet argues that Richard Turner's work epitomises the 
spirit of this period. He suggests that Turner's 
understanding of Walter Benjamin's dialectic of civilisation 
and barbarism ( as each in and of the other rather than 
oppositional) , allows Turner to hold and to advocate the 
holding of a double perspective or hermeneutic (Paul 
Ricoeur's term). This double hermeneutic is constituted by 
the hermeneutic of hope on the one hand, and the hermeneutic 
of suspicion, on the other. This dual perspective, Morphet 
argues, is also characteristic of Biko's work. The need for 
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a double hermeneutic is evidenced by Turner's call for a more 
nuanced approach to colonial discourse analysis: 
The polarisation of the issue into a civilised/ 
uncivilised dichotomy has prevented a clear 
analysis of the difference and similarities 
between African and European culture. Furthermore, 
by describing European culture as civilization, 
one unconsciously tends to see it as unchanging, 
as final (1972 24). 
While Turner demonstrates a hermeneutic of suspicion when he 
demonstrates the weight of discourse in the structuring of 
perceptions and power relations, his hermeneutic of hope on 
the other hand, allows him to believe in the possibilities of 
human agency and change. Morphet argues that while both Biko 
and Turner were reacting (in the spirit of modernists) to the 
intellectual disintegration and defeat of late 19th century 
liberalism, their "grounding category" was, nevertheless, the 
"traditional 
individual 
conceptual bastion of 
consciousness: the view 
liberalism the 
that the inner 
intentionality of people counted in the end more than their 
public meaning" (89). Where Biko and Turner digressed from 
conventional liberalism, however, is in their call for a 
radical and critical consciousness of the conditions of 
exploitation and repression which existed in South Africa 
during the apartheid era. Real social change then follows as 
a matter of course. 
Biko's conception of a "true humanity" contains an element of 
the visionary (hermeneutic of hope). He demonstrates a 
concern to move beyond the negritudinist/nativist positions 
described by Irele and Appiah respectively, but also at the 
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same time, is concerned to revise received concepts of 
humanity and universalism supplied by the west. He expresses 
the need to create a new and distinctly South African society 
based on the reworking of (liberal) political traditions into 
new forms of awareness and consciousness of the poverty of 
human relations and values. Halisi argues that both black and 
African nationalism undergo a "theoretical reconstruction" at 
the hands of black consciousness philosophy, a reconstruction 
which, according to Anthony Giddens, "signifies taking a 
theory apart and putting it back together again in a new form 




Black Consciousness and the Crisis of Self in To Every Birth 
Its Blood
David Attwell makes the claim that Serote's work has "close 
affinities" with black consciousness. In this regard, he 
suggests that Serote's "earliest categories of social 
analysis are racial ones", and that Serote "unmistakably 
deploys formal and ideological strategies that show a 
conscious identification with the black world and its 
traditions" (DLB 125 295). 
My concern in this chapter is twofold. Firstly my focus will 
be the identification of the "formal and ideological 
strategies" used by Serote which cast him as a "black 
consciousness artist", with specific reference to his single 
novel, To Every Birth Its Blood with a view to ascertaining 
the implications this particular reliance on the so-called 
racial categories of analysis has for the type of social 
order Serote envisages through his fiction. In doing so, I 
rely on the theoretical writings of Steve Biko, so-called 
founder of the black consciousness movement, as a point of 
entry into the theoretical intricacies of the philosophy of 
the movement established to some extent in the preceding 
chapters and which, I argue, verify the contentions made by 
Attwell concerning Serote's position vis-a-vis black 
consciousness. 
Secondly, I intend to situate Serote, (as a black writer and 
as a black intellectual) as well as the Black Consciousness 
movement, within a specifically modernist 
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framework 
characterised by an emphasis on a focused individual 
subjectivity (the search for self) and an emphasis on the 
assertion of national identity (the search for nationhood). 
To an extent, these two projects are related. I would argue 
that much of what is put forward as a specifically black 
response to apartheid oppression cannot readily be separated 
from the modernist drive towards national identity. As Gilroy 
has argued, the assertion of black nationalism represents an 
approach which has deep roots within the intellectual 
traditions of European enlightenment and project of modernity 
(1993:121). Indeed, I would suggest that black consciousness 
offers a pivotal moment which allows black South Africans to 
be interpellated within the discourse and trajectory of 
modernism (to "enter history" as it were) and that this is 
revealed through the impact which black consciousness is 
shown to have on the Alexandra community about which Serote 
writes. 
The "Power Days" are shown to have had a profound effect on 
the collective psyche of the black community. Movement 
activist, Tuki, acknowledges this influence when he reflects 
that " ... when the slogan was: Black Man, you are on your 
own! ... South Africa had become, in no time, a different 
country" (330). Tuki's political career, from its inception 
in the ranks of the black consciousness movement, is depicted 
in terms of "going through time" with other people { 331), the 
path towards the telos of liberation being depicted as a 
page 69 
"timeline" of history. The struggle towards an inevitable 
liberation is again shown to rely securely on the movement of 
time when John reflects that, as a result of the 1976 
uprisings, a "relationship had been established" that "time 
was to nurture" (169). This relationship, however, is 
necessarily dependent on the development of a true 
consciousness and knowledge of the conditions of oppression 
in South Africa. Serote suggests that this "true" 
consciousness owes its origins to the Power days of black 
consciousness resistance which precipitated the re-birth of 
a new generation of black people. Reflecting on the "Black 
Consciousness days", Dikeledi remarks that " ... in those days, 
a new, brand-new black woman and man had been created" ( 2 35) , 
the suggestion being, of course, that the creation of a new 
black man and woman will necessarily lead to the creation of 
a "brand-new" social order. 
Kelwyn Sole, using much of the evidence already cited, argues 
that the inevitability of liberation through (specifically) 
Movement politics is "open to doubt only in the length of 
time it may or may not take" (72) and argues that Serote's 
novel presents an understanding of politics that is largely 
"positivist and nationalist" and which stresses that "the 
common goal of ending foreign (in this case white} domination 
in itself brings about a unity among colonised (or, in this 
case, oppressed) people" (72). Sole argues that the 
inclusivity and confidence with which the Movement is 
presented by Serote as a panacea to the problems of colonial 
oppression, allow for an interpretation of Serote's novel on 
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the basis of a "sweeping" 'Third World' nationalism (70). 
This optimistic nationalism, for Sole, highlights the 
manichaeanism which operates in the novel and which presents 
an "absolute dichotomy" ( 69) between pre- and post-liberation 
existence. Sole argues that Serote's idea of revolutionary 
change is based on a re-inversion of "normal standards and 
values" ( 61). The false sense of order imposed in South 
Africa by "mad men" (166) constituting white minority 
leadership is to be exposed for the disorder it represents 
for black South Africans and a proper sense of order 
established in its place. Sole's criticism of Serote rests 
largely on what he construes as an "overstatement" of the 
power of the Movement/liberation (the two are essentially 
synonymous) to effect such a comprehensive reversal. Sole 
argues that by depicting the Movement as an "order-creating" 
remedy which at the same time "guarantees" a happy human 
subject, Serote is guilty of naively simplifying the process 
of decolonization. Sole also remarks that this
"overstatement" has affinities with " ... the problems [that) 
similar conceptualisations of the politico-psychological 
interface bring about in the work of theorists of national 
identity and psychology" ( 7 4) . Sole cites Fanon as an example 
of such theorists and implies an intellectual debt on 
Serote's behalf when he remarks that Fanon was "an important 
influence on Black Consciousness writers in South Africa" 
( 7 4) 
Sole's misgivings concerning the misconceptualisation of the 
"politico-psychological interface" (by Serote and Fanon), I 
page 71 
would suggest, amount to a more fundamental concern relating 
to the conceptualisation of the relationship between the self 
and the social in the particular formation of black 
consciousness discourse as represented by these two authors. 
The "affinities'' which To Every Birth Its Blood bears to 
black consciousness philosophy are consistently revealed 
through the links presented by Serote between consciousness 
and reality. Serote describes the Movement as ''an idea in the 
minds of a people" (327). Oupa again articulates the dynamic 
of this relationship when he remarks that as a result of the 
Power days "[p)eople have realised, have discovered who they 
are, and what they can do" (193). The capacity for action is 
thus a necessary product of self-consciousness. What is 
apparent is the extent to which Serote presents a conception 
of the (black) self which qualifies him for inclusion within 
a black consciousness paradigm as expressed by Biko himself: 
The interrelationship between the consciousness of 
the self and the emancipatory programme is of 
paramount importance ... we cannot be conscious of 
ourselves and yet remain in bondage. We want to 
attain the envisioned self which is a free self 
( 4 9) 
The specifically black political struggle waged by Biko and 
the black consciousness movement is construed as 
automatically expressive of the racial differences with which 
it is articulated. Like Se rote's ·novel, it speaks of a 
unified conception of the South African black world, united 
in opposition through the consciousness of its oppression to 
apartheid. 
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Tsi Mo lope' s ambivalent position in relation to the Movement, 
instead of undermining its liberatory possibilities, 
demonstrates the dangers which exist in making incorrect 
choices about one's ideological alignment. Tsi captures the 
predicament of the alienated, angst-ridden intellectual, 
bearing the burden of modernity -- the quest for meaning in 
a world that seems bereft of meaning: 5 
... [sJomething had snapped. Nothing was visible. 
No words meant anything (Serote 1986 62). 
Tsi' s lack of faith in the meaning of words threatens to 
render him impotent in the struggle for change, in the 
struggle to make sense in the context of what seems to him, 
senseless disorder. While his continual references to a 
fragmented memory create a self-conscious (modern) text which 
reflects on its own artistic disunity and temporal 
disintegration, memory is also shown in the novel to 
represent a potentially powerful retrospective discourse with 
which to challenge the disabling (present) discourse of 
silence. The problem that Tsi faces is that without a 
reliable memory, he cannot situate himself historically, 
recover a continuity with the past and thus achieve a 
consistent identity. As a result, he becomes a victim of 
hopelessness and powerlessness in the face of a perceptibly 
invasive and omnipotent political regime. The withdrawal from 
history that this effects, the retirement into an intense 
subjectivity, reduces the possibilLties for development or 
change because it is a sense of history which allows for the 
possibilities of emancipation from present conditions of 
existence. 
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The lack of an historical consciousness and a fragmented 
identity which Tsi's memory dramatises, stands in contrast 
to the position of Ma-Maria, a character introduced in the 
second part of the novel. Ma-Maria's memory, unlike Tsi's, is 
able to provide both herself and Onalenna with a sense of 
historical worth a.nd national selfhood. Onalenna comments how 
she and Ma-Maria are "totally different, yet terribly the 
same" ( 2 84) and in so doing, she draws attention to the 
difference in the strategy of resistance adopted by the two 
women owing, in the main, to the change of historical context 
affecting the particular roles assumed by women vis-a-vis the 
liberation struggle. (Oni has chosen a path of overt activism 
and guerilla tactics, while Ma-Maria's role, while 
acknowledged as important, was more a case of "keeping the 
faith" (284)). Ma-Maria's forbearance, however, and her faith 
in the inevitability of change through human agency and 
commitment (of one sort or another) is reflected in her 
comment that, 
... not one of us is going to stand for the pain 
that these things cause us, and it is bound to 
change. If God isn't bringing any fire, we are 
going to make the fire (281). 
For Onalenna, Ma-Maria symbolizes an entire history of black 
struggle against colonialism and apartheid. Thus it is "[fJor 
record, for history, for memory" (282) that Oni is driven to 
know Ma-Maria's age in order to reclaim that history as her 
own, the retrieval of which is directly related to a capacity 
for hope and inspiration. Ma-Maria's life then constitutes a 
documentation of the struggle by blacks against oppression 
and her position in the novel is symbolic of the aspiration 
page 74 
of the black consciousness movement to uncover an 
historiography of resistance aimed at the reconstitution of 
a people deprived of a positive historical image. Steve Biko, 
appropriating the words of Franz Fanon, explains this concern 
on the part of the black consciousness movement on the 
following basis: 
... the colonialists were not satisfied merely with 
holding a people in their grip and emptying the Native's 
brain of all form and content, they turned to the past 
of the oppressed people and distorted, disfigured and 
destroyed it ... There is always an interplay between the 
history of a people ie. the past, and their faith in 
themselves and hopes for their future (29). 
Therefore, as logical re-dress, 
... part of the approach envisaged in bringing 
about "black consciousness" has to be directed to 
the past, to seek to rewrite the history of the 
black man and to produce in it the heroes who fonn 
the core of the African background (29). 
The concern with re-writing the history of the black 
man/nation is a persistent one in To Every Birth Its Blood. 
While not adhering consistently to formal black consciousness 
political positions in his novel, Serote reveals a 
unmistakeable "affinity" with black consciousness in his 
preoccupation with asserting the historical lineage of black 
struggle in South Africa, dating back to the inception of 
colonization. "The Movement", symbol of black opposition, is 
given primordial status when it is lyrically described at one 
point as being, 
as old as the grave of the first San or Khoikhoi 
who was killed by a bullet that came from a ship 
which anchored at Cape Town to establish a stop 
station ... (Serote 318). 
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The Movement is portrayed as being synonymous with black 
resistance to colonial oppression. If we assume (rather 
safely) that "The Movement" in Serote's novel represents the 
African National Congress, formed in 1912 as a body of 
organised resistance to colonial and apartheid oppression, 
literally centuries after "that unfortunate date - 1652 ... " 
(Biko 40), it becomes possible to detect a strategy of 
romanticisation in the extensive symbolic power and 
historical scope given to the Movement. However, the 
concerted attempt at the reconstruction of a heritage of 
resistance in To Every Birth Its Blood. the uncovering of an 
heroic African past, positions it securely within the 
parameters of black consciousness objectives as outlined 
above by Steve Biko. 
The nostalgia demonstrated by both Biko and Serote seems to 
implicate them to some degree in what Anthony Kwame Appiah 
terms a "nativist" position vis-a-vis the struggle for 
freedom from colonialism, an exclusivist cultural nationalism 
which Appiah criticises for its facile division of the world 
into a topology of "inside and outside - indigene and alien" 
(56). Elleke Boehmer, in keeping with her emphasis on 
historical categorization, argues that what she terms the 
"early moment of anti-imperialist nationalist -- or more 
accurately, nativist -- resistance" (100), is distinguished 
by "a strenuous defence of the virtues of native culture, 
characterized as rich, pure, and authentic" (100). Such 
strenuous defence, however, is clearly manifest in Biko's 
essays, written during the 1970's in South Africa. A 
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distinctly nativist inclination is apparent in Biko's work 
when he explains the necessity of depicting the "authentic 
cultural aspects of the African people" and the need for 
uncovering the "fundamental aspects of the pure African 
culture ... " { 41). Notwithstanding the problematic assumption 
of the existence of a "pure" culture, of any sort, Biko's 
assessment of African culture, despite the inclusiveness 
overtly given to the term "black" by the black consciousness 
movement, means that his enunciation of the merits of a 
culture which is "man-centred", communitarian, has a natural 
affinity for "song and rhythm", is anti-materialist, 
spiritual and closer to nature which makes it easier for 
Africans to "identify with [people] in any emotional 
situation arising out of suffering" (46), clearly has 
application for African culture only. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the category of "African culture" is in itself an 
enormously broad one, and one that, in reality, does not 
easily submit to reductive categorization of this nature, 
Biko's analysis of "Some African Cultural Concepts", has 
little resonance for other cultural groupings in South 
Africa, who are equally oppressed and who have, according to 
the theoretical tenets of the black consciousness movement, 
been granted the right to declare themselves "black". I would 
argue that the tension which arises is that which exists 
between attempts to use the category of "blackness", on the 
one hand as a political tool, aimed at rallying as broad a 
support base as possible, and on the other hand, attempts to 
essentialise the qualities of "blackness" and in so doing, 
create an ultimately exclusivist paradigm and which provides 
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evidence of the oppositions or topologies enunciated and 
resisted by Appiah as being ultimately restrictive. 
Although differences between Westerners and Africans are 
reduced to oppositional stereotypes, and despite his rhetoric 
concerning the purity of cultural origins, Biko does concede 
the existence of an essentially "modern" African culture, 
which he defines as a culture "that has used concepts from 
the white world to expand on inherent cultural 
characteristics" ( 45). Biko demonstrates a self-reflexivity 
here which takes him beyond the purely nativist categories 
outlined by Boehmer and Appiah. The likelihood of 
hybridization in the context of modernity, is again 
acknowledged when he speaks of his belief in the ability of 
the African to stay with "people of other cultures'' and yet 
"be able to contribute to the joint cultures of the 
communities they have joined" ( 45). While open to the idea of 
mutually influencing cultures, Biko's conception of cultural 
origins nevertheless seems to embrace the notion of pristine 
and authentic beginnings and thus draws links with Boehmer's 
description of nativism as the idea that a peoples' identity 
lay embedded in cultural origins, and was fully recoverable, 
unadulterated by colonialism (100). While Biko would seem to 
concede the importance of identifying with these origins, and 
despite his apparent adherence to a system of binary 
oppositions between Western and African culture, I would 
argue that the origins of black consciousness itself and the 
perception of its necessity among oppressed South Africans, 
stem precisely from an acute awareness of the extent to which 
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black identity has undergone a process of brutal adulteration 
by colonialism. When Biko concedes that the "advent of the 
Western Culture has changed our outlook almost drastically" 
{46), leaving behind it a "bastardised" culture, he is 
already acknowledging a merger of cultures which disallows 
any unproblematic retrieval of culture and tradition. Boeh.mer 
puts this process into perspective when, discussing early 
anti-colonial movements, she argues that, 
culture -- in the form of reinterpreted history, 
religious revivals, elegiac and nostalgic poetry -
developed into an important front for 
nationalist mobilization. To this end literary 
conventions and discourses inherited from the 
colonizer were appropriated, translated, 
decentred, and hybridized in ways which we now 
name postcolonial but were in fact at the time
anti-colonial, often opportunistic, tactical and 
ad hoc, and which formed an important means of 
self-expression (100). 
With the benefit of hindsight then, the bastardization of a 
culture at the hands of the colonising power, is never as 
one-sided a process as it seems. The inevitable "decentering" 
which occurs allows for interesting postcolonial 
possibilities. Boehmer's analysis tends to give more 
substance to the political and conscious aspects of identity 
construction and cultural borrowing. In so doing, she 
detracts, to an extent, from the importance of an analysis of 
the origins and implications of essentialism implicit in 
resistance strategies. Admittedly, Boehmer is speaking quite 
specifically about what she terms "the early nationalist 
vision", specifically in literature which, she claims, "did 
not rule out the prospect of interaction with Europeans" 
(101). Boeh.mer's understanding of "nativism" is again caught 
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within a particular historical moment. The term is used by 
her to denote a "relatively sedate preliminary to the more 
overt political liberation which followed". Boehmer argues 
that these earlier movements were distinct in their intention 
to achieve an "inversion" of imperial values and structures. 
However, while Boehrner's explication would seem to imply that 
nativism and its rhetoric constitutes merely an historical, 
transient phase in the development of the African 
intellectual, responsible for laying "the ideological and 
strategic bedrock of later developments" ( 100), Appiah, on 
the other hand, structures his understanding of the term, 
less on the foundations of historical periodization, but 
rather ( and more usefully, I believe), according to the 
oppositions asserted by "topologies" which he is able to 
discern in the work of certain African writers and critics 
who are "able in contemporary Africa to mobilize the 
undoubted power of a nationalist rhetoric ... " ( 56). The 
essence of Appiah' s understanding and use of the nativist 
term, despite his more "universal" application of the term, 
is however similar to that of Boehmer in that he conceives of 
nativist work as constituting a reverse discourse whereby the 
terms of resistance are already stipulated by western 
cultural imperatives. What Appiah's definition allows for, 
however, is an application of the term "nativist" to aspects 
of present-day nationalist movements and it is this component 
of his definition which I believe has application in the case 
of both Biko and Serote, plagued as they are, by topologies 
of colonialism. 
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Appiah's ideas again coincide with Boehmer's analysis on the 
issue of the degree to which "mimesis" by the colonised 
intellectual of colonial tropes, in particular, the strong 
reference to the authority of the cultural past, formed a 
useful and necessary tool which the colonised could use to 
build a stable and defiant identity. Boehmer is anxious not 
to be seen to be suggesting that modernism as a set of 
discursive practices was simply "imposed" on the Empire, and 
to this end, stresses the fact that colonial writers were 
"critically engaging" with the writing of the centre. This 
criticality, it is implied, resides in the fact that colonial 
writers ' appropriated its (the centre's] 




In drawing links between the Western cultural tradition and 
nativism by suggesting that nativists themselves demonstrate 
a degree of nostalgia and sentimentalism "so familiar after 
Rousseau", Appiah is abrogating the ease with which nativists 
can claim absolute cultural autonomy. The particular 
reference to Rousseau in this case, introduces strong 
parallels between nativism and the conception of man as 
individual of the Enlightenment on the brink of modernity. 
What Appiah's argument attempts, and I would argue, succeeds 
in doing, is to confirm the futility of any attempt at an 
absolute and unreflexive authenticity. Such an attempt 
results not in the formation of a new and independent 
identity, but in "counteridentification" (Pecheux 1983 158) 
which describes the process of participating in institutional 
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configurations, -- to be subjected to cultural identities 
one officially decries (Appiah 60). While referring in the 
main to African literature, I would argue that Appiah's 
analysis holds equal weight for an understanding of political 
and social structures and codes of meanings which prevail in 
post-colonial societies today. Despite the ease with which 
Biko enters the topologies of counteridentification 
against colonialist discourse which itself divides the world 
into self/other, inside/outside, alien/indigene the 
futility of an unreflexive authenticity, the impossibility of 
unproblematic retrieval, is nevertheless at times implicit in 
Biko's arguments, and leads him away from counter-
identification, towards a position closer to that of 
"disidentification" (Pecheux 158) For example, 
acknowledgment that, 
[ t J he great powers 
wonders in giving 
military look, but 
come from Africa 
face ( Biko 4 7) . 
of the world may have done 
the world an industrial and 
the great gift still has to 
giving the world a more human 
his 
Biko thus shows himself at times, capable of entering into 
what I would refer to as a "post-colonial disposition", which 
introduces the possibilities for a self-reflexive creation of 
a new state based on hybridity and amalgamation and starting 
from the !?remise of humanism (in itself a notably "western" 
construct). Biko's dismissal of the !?attern of the dialectic 
as !?resented by white liberalism, which has, as its goal, a 
synthesis/alternative which is acceptable only to the white 
man and thus restricts itself to the possibilities of a white 
(exploitative) value system, is further evidence of his 
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desire for change which goes beyond a "mere change of face of 
those in governing positions" ( 149). Biko argues strongly 
that the antithesis of apartheid can never be non-racialism 
as this will produce a vaguely defined synthesis because the 
antithesis of non-racialism is not sufficiently different to 
its thesis. His alternative dialectic has white racism as the 
thesis, counterpoised by a strongly antithetical black 
solidarity. Biko's synthesis is "some kind of balance -- a 
true humanity where power politics will have no place". 
Biko's "some kind of balance", though ill-defined, 
nevertheless bears the seeds of an interesting, if open, new 
position. 
The confident strategy of Solomon T Plaatjie in his novel 
Mhudi, of appropriating the colonial gaze through "sweeping 
scenic descriptions and bird's-eye views of battlefields" 
(Boehmer 103), and which asserts the right of the 
colonized/nationalists to claim the land under gaze as their 
own, and of course this claim to ownership extends, by 
implication to the sphere of politics and culture, differs 
from the strategy employed by Serote who, writing decades 
later after enduring a period of seemingly infinite 
oppression, employs the distinctly modernist technique of the 
quest the search for self and nationhood and the means by 
which to achieve this. While intellectually, Tsi Molope is 
able to understand the full extent of his deprivation, the 
nature of apartheid is such that he nevertheless still needs 
to struggle against losing "the memory" of having rightful 
claims to the country of his birth. This is an inherent 
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danger which is expressed in the novel by Tsi 's friend, 
Boykie: 
You know that it is only in our memory that this 
is our land. We imagine that we have a home, we 
know that in reality, if there was a quick way 
that these settlers would wipe us out, they 
would ... (78). 
Tsi's hold on the past is through his memory, but this proves 
to be a tenuous link. Memory, he claims "can be an unreliable 
mirror", that provides "no fixed picture", but a lot of 
"fiction". Hence, Tsi is unable to locate himself 
historically. His memory fails to give him a continuity with 
the past and thus challenges any attempt at a consistent 
identity and concomitant sense of empowerment. 
The lack of empowerment experienced by Tsi is shown by Serote 
to be particularly demoralizing. I would argue however, that 
the approach adopted by the apartheid forces towards its 
victims, while it is dehumanizing, is one that seeks the 
demasculinization of its victims as well. Tsi's father 
epitomises the pathos of the "fallen man": 
" ... Ts iets i, if you think there are two bu 11 s in this 
house, you better choose to go through that door," my 
father said. He was looking at me through his broken 
spectacles ... (98). 
Any attempt at manly potency and assertion suggested by the 
bull analogy is simultaneously undermined by the image of 
Tsi 's ageing father with ailing eyesight, forced through 
poverty to wear "broken spectacles h . The father figure is a 
recurring image in Serote's poetry. The father repeatedly 
represents an image of failure in the world outside his home, 
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the world of the white man. The powerless aggression of �he 
father is treated with contempt by his offspring. This male 
impotency is also expressed in the poetry of Oswald Mtshali: 
My father is not there 
He had left me, a child, 
with his penis to eat for a boerewors 
and his testicles to slice as onion and tomato 
to gravy my dry and stale mieliepap. 
In the absence of the male as provider and head of the 
family, the male phallus is given up for reproachful 
consumption by the child because of its utter uselessness and 
denigration in the world of the white man. The black male 
under the force of apartheid has lost the symbol of his 
maleness and thus his agency. The lines of connection between 
sexuality and identity are constantly drawn by Serote during 
the course of his novel. 
After the permit raid on Tsi and Lily's house, Tsi lies in 
bed, the incident having exposed him as a powerless and 
destitute victim with nothing to offer to anyone. He has 
difficulty defining himself in positive terms: 
Everything that I was was there with me in the bed. My 
bad breath ... ; my pounding aching head; my fear ... ; my 
recollection of · the banging on the door; my 
helplessness, my despair, my anger, my limp muscle, 
which lay looped as if it were ashamed to have ever 
erected; I lay there and gave my life to Lily (51). 
Tsi's "limp" penis extends the metaphor of despair and 
ineffectuality. While it is Tsi's human dignity which has 
been assaulted by the permit raid, his concern seems to be 
expressed largely in terms of an assault on his sexual 
virility. His sexuality is again under threat when he and 
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Boykie are detained and assaulted by policeman when 
travelling back from Lebowa. Tsi is forced to undergo a 
degrading and agonising attack on his genitals. It is the 
incident of his meeting with Tshidi however, after his 
release, that demonstrates the extent and nature of the 
trauma caused to the male psyche. Tsi reflects on the ordeal 
of the assault: 
I thought about the floor of shame and the eyes that had 
pierced me, pushing me into accepting that I belong to 
shame, by pulling my balls ... That took me face to face 
with the past night I had spent with Tshidi ... 
Tsi 's assault at the hands of the security police has 
repercussions for him in the sense that he views the incident 
with shame and self-loathing, but what is interesting is the 
immediate way in which this incident is connected to his 
failed sexual encounter with Tshidi. Despite the demand 
uttered by Tshidi that he "be a man", Tsi cannot easily 
dissociate the sexual act from the violence inflicted on him 
at the expense of his male dignity. Tsi's concern is that 
because he failed to have an erection, Tshidi has realised 
how "hollow a man" he is and he fully expects to be ousted 
from her home because of his failed performance as such. 
Tshidi herself then undergoes a process of self-doubt about 
her capacities as a woman because of her failure to induce 
the correct male response. Afterwards, Tsi is "[l]ost and 
torn apart, my mind erased speech from me" (113). 
Tsi's threatened identity is compounded by an inability to 
express/assert his self verbally. It strikes me that the way 
in which sexuality is tied up with identity, particularly 
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gender identity, has important ramifications for the ways in 
which oppression is handled by its subject. The guilt which 
Tsi feels is in itself, a breach of the male code. Tsi's 
father on a later occasion, in a reconciliatory mood, says to 
Tsi, 
No, I don't want you to feel guilty, a man must 
not feel guilty, but a man must know what he is 
doing (145). 
Tsi's very existence, however, seems to embody one of shame 
and guilt and thus offers few possibilities for the 
reconstitution of the (male) subject. When Tsi tells Lily 
that he has "no confidence as a reporter" (71) one can 
discern a lack of confidence which extends beyond the field 
of professional occupation. There is a sense in which Tsi 
lacks confidence as a man, as a human being and as a citizen 
of his country. The suggestion that this lack of confidence 
runs deeper than his capacity to do his job, is verified by 
his failure to sustain any form of employment. Even his job 
at Mcleans College fails to offer him sufficient meaning with 
which to re-articulate a meaningful identity, a failing which 
Serote attributes to the ideological principles of the 
college. 
However, Tsi's attitude after the assault develops an 
interesting degree of decisiveness which suggests that the 
assault, in epitomising the brutality of the white apartheid 
system against blacks serves to focus his animosity and 
potential for resistance and positions him clearly as black 
against white. His comments and thoughts at this point are 
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interestingly similar to the black consciousness positions 
propagated by Biko. In his interview with fellow reporter 
Anne, Tsi claims that he does "not recognise the police, the 
courts, the 1 aw which is made by white people in this 
country ... " ( 121) . He goes on to describe the relationship 
between himself and fellow reporter, Anne at that point: 
She [Anne] knew that I had contempt for her, for her 
symbolic self, for her having been born into that world 
whose dreams were my nightmares, whose nightmares 
challenged my life, luring it to death. I knew she knew 
this. We had talked about it, in those days when my eyes 
were blurred to the flame that now and then came closer 
and closer to my wings as I grew up (122-123). 
Tsi echoes Biko's opinions on the futility of black/white 
interaction. Tsi's intimation is that the time for talking 
about things with whites has passed, now that he has realised 
and lived the full "flame" of apartheid tyranny. What Serote 
is illustrating, through the.tense relationship between Anne 
and Tsi, is the ultimate futility of what Biko would call 
"artificial" integration and which dictates that true 
integration is not possible under the circumstances of real 
segregation and discursive positioning under apartheid, and 
that each brings to the table certain complexes which it is 
first necessary to overcome. Tsi' s bitterness towards the 
impotent and misdirected white liberal is apparent in his 
ironic representation of the lift scene. While consciously 
choosing to ignore the baiting of the racist lift man, Tsi's 
white college takes up his defence "perhaps thinking [he] was 
speechless as kaffirs should be" (127). 
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Tsi's resignation from his newspaper job and his withdrawal 
from journalism indicate a refusal to participate in the 
codes and institutions of white-controlled industry: 
I left the white paper blank. I refused to return 
the stare of the typewriter keyboard (135). 
Tsi chooses silence and inarticulateness over participation 
in the conventional master/slave narratives which he 
perceives as characterising his participation in all facets 
of South African life. Like his father, Tsi becomes silent, 
but nevertheless continues to "witness" the events around 
him. He comments on the significance of the power days which 
are described by him in organic terms and as being an agent 
of change: 
The flood had come, had happened; the infants of 
that year bore their real names (140). 
Tsi describes his parents as having changed too, as having 
become more accepting of the political movements initiated by 
black youth. When Tsi's mother says, "I don't envy anyone who 
tries to control people's minds" (163), she reveals a 
sophisticated understanding of the psychology of apartheid 
which echoes many of the concerns expressed by Biko relating 
to the psychological effects of oppression. There is, in 
Tsi's mother's comments, evidence of a positive intellectual 
and ideological progression towards a viewpoint which echoes 
Nandy's idea of an oppressive system as incorporating both 
oppressors 
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and oppressed not as victors and losers 
respectively, but as mutual victims. 
Tsi's commentary to the media about McLean's college is again 
indicative of an intellectual debt owed to black 
consciousness philosophy. His idea of a successful education 
system as one based on "the dynamic relationship between 
consciousness and reality" repeats the black consciousness 
emphasis on the intimacy between (self) consciousness and 
material reality as expressed by Biko himself: 
The interrelationship between the consciousness of 
the self and the emancipatory programme is of 
paramount importance (49). 
The black consciousness position, however, is taken further 
in Tsi's analysis when he argues that such an educational 
system would also "respect the principle that knowledge must 
be supplemented by action" ( Serote 160). Here, Tsi 
acknowledges the truth of Oupa' s later comment that { owing to 
the Power days) "(p]eople have realised, have discovered who 
they are, and what they can do" (193). It is the process of 
discovery initiated by black consciousness philosophy which 
is recognised by Tsi, while at the same time, it is 
understood to be merely groundwork. Tsi goes on to stress 
that much work needs to be done to "re-establish an 
educational system which will teach the black child that he 
is a citizen of South Africa and that he bears responsibility 
for this country" (160). While the emphasis in Tsi's remark 
appears to be the link between ideas and reality, Tsi 's 
resignation from McLeans on the basis that no educational 
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system can be devised to benefit blacks while the white 
government continues in power, also shows a more practical 
and materialistic concern with the unequal distribution of 
educational resources by a power-hungry, self-seeking regime. 
The binaries of black consciousness discourse are given 
expression in To Every Birth Its Blood and are articulated 
most succinctly by Boykie who declares that Tsi must 
" ... understand the name of the game, it is called, 'them and 
us'" (96). On the issue of Bram Fischer's treatment at the 
hands of the South African state, Boykie argues that "[i)t 
was a lesson for those white boys who disregard white 
rules ... (a) ny white person who does not keep the rules of the 
game will be punished and that will be a lesson for the 
others who want to get out of step" (96). Boykie appears to 
adopt a position in the novel which has strong affiliations 
with the black consciousness position on non-integration. He 
castigates Tsi's activist brother, Fix, whom he labels as 
"sharp but clumsy" (93) and takes a strongly antithetical 
position to that of Fix. It is Fix who shows a more 
conciliatory attitude in the novel 
I was taught to love and to respect and be polite. 
I cannot disregard that because whites are doing 
what they are doing. I have to find a way of using 
their gift (93). 
Boykie's understanding of and adherence to the theoretical 
foundations of the black consciousness movement is further 
evidenced when he tells Tsi that he is "with the BS06 right
now but ... realise[s) that it is only a stage, just a stage 
in our battle to reclaim a home for ourselves ... "(79). As the 
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central protagonist {at least in part one), Tsi attempts to 
live out the "battle" to which Boykie refers. The figure of 
Tsi articulates one of the founding tropes of the "modern" in 
literature: that of the individual, alienated and estranged 
from the surrounding society. Tsi Molope assumes the 
proportions of an existentialist hero in the early stages of 
the novel when, once again on the streets of Alexandra, he 
says, 
(a] s usual, I was walking into crowds. I have 
never walked with crowds. I walk into them. Where 
was I going with four rands in my pocket? (5). 
While Tsi 's withdrawal from "the crowd" arguably contains 
echoes of the claim made by existentialist philosopher, Soren 
Kierkegaarde that "a crowd in its very concept is the 
untruth", a philosophical pronouncement of this nature 
becomes more complicated in a South African context, where 
rejection of the crowd throws into jeopardy all attempts at 
oppositional solidarity politics. Tsi's inability to 
integrate himself, while registering his personal alienation, 
also symbolically registers his political alienation, his 
inability to commit himself to "movement" politics. It is 
this lack of commitment, this withdrawal from the crowd, 
which the novel suggests, perpetuates his alienation, both 
personal and political. 
In his introduction to a collection of essays entitled The 
Modern World: Ten Great Writers, Malcolm Bradbury describes 
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the plight of the "modern" writer as bearing the burden for 
expressing, 
... the fractured disorder of an era where abstract 
nouns seemed irrelevant, nature seemed an 
aggression against the self, and the self seemed 
to be able to discover only defacement, despair 
and defeat (1989 13). 
Tsi 's continual references to the "madness" of the government 
and its agents which represent an outward political disorder, 
is mirrored by an internal anguish and anxiety where the self 
seems to be able to discover only similar "defacement, 
despair and defeat". Tsi's sense of impotence and alienation 
in the face of modern development is also evident when he 
says, 
Crowds and crowds of footsteps.�.all manacled by 
time, by the cruel and real time of moments, when 
machines demanded attention because something 
called gold demands to be crushed and sifted and 
sold (111). 
According to C R D Halisi, Steve Biko considered the 
transformation of consciousness to be a catalyst for mass 
action. Common to most student ideologies of the decade (the 
60's) was a concern with consciousness, culture, alienation, 
community and the dimension of everyday life as the most 
important reference for political activity (Pityana Ed. 109). 
This is in keeping with the existentialist idea that a moment 
comes for the individual when he or she must make an 
irrevocable choice and that such moments are the only "real" 
ones. ·The choice to be made for existentialists, is an 
ethical rather than an aesthetic one which is based on 
transient preferences. The choice is paramount because even 
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if we choose wrongly, if the choice is made with earnestness 
and struggle, we become. new selves that could not have 
existed until that particular choice was made. The choice 
then acts as catalyst for the development/discovery of the 
self. Throughout To Every Birth Its Blood, Tsi and the other 
characters in the novel, are presented and are continually 
presenting themselves, in classic existential style, with 
choices about their lives, choices which inevitably involve 
some form of change. In the early stages of the novel, Tsi is 
seen to resist even contemplating the choices which confront 
him: 
I was sitting on the grave of my grandfather. I 
fought the thought that nagged me, which wanted to 
know whether he heard me when I asked about Fix; 
and also, when I told him that I was getting tired 
of going to the shebeen; and that I wouldn't go to 
church. I fought this thought. I will fight, fight 
it forever, By corning here, every Sunday, I will 
fight it; I know he is listening, and asking 
whether I was willing to change. This is where the 
trouble started -- was I willing to change? (11-
12) 
Tsi intuitively seems to sense a certain self-deception, an 
existence based on Sartrean "bad faith". 
While the novel endorses the motivational force of 
retrospective thinking, the difficulty of translating this 
progression into reality is also acknowledged in the figure 
of Tsi. Tsi's search for meaning and real commitment is 
plagued by a sense of hopelessness and powerlessness which 
translate into a subjective angst. The final moment of 
epiphany, however follows the death of his nephew Oupa, at 
the hands of the security police. Up to this point, Tsi has 
avoided direct political engagement. The imperatives of the 
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novel are such that all characters in the end necessarily 
prostrate themselves at the altar of political activism. The 
position Tsi takes on the issue of Oupa's murder constitutes 
the leap of faith required, but existing avenues for 
political involvement, short of incarceration, deny him the 
opportunity to implement his principles in the form of 
political action. He is exiled from South Africa and is, 
ironically, still unable to name himself ie. define himself 
and his position: 
I had become something called a refugee. At first, that 
is what I called myself. Then I said, I am a political 
refugee. Then I did not want that tag. I said I was an 
exile. Then I said, how can I say I am an exile when I 
am in Africa? No, I am not an exile. What am I then? 
(346). 
While on the one hand, the novel seems to endorse the 
position that dedication to the Movement offers the only 
salvation to the life of the oppressed in South Africa, Tsi's 
inability to finally locate himself, both materially and 
discursively, vis-a-vis the country of his birth, creates a 
degree of ambiguity regarding the extent to which the 
Movement can guarantee a successful political and cultural 
revolution. However, the ambiguity is rather tenuous when 
compared with the degree of inevitability with which the 
characters of the novel finally commit themselves to 
"Movement" politics. It is in this regard that the 
existentialist ethic in the novel does not reach fruition. 
This is evident in Onalenna's comment that, 
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... the struggle is forever assured of its victory, when 
those who carry it forward follow the correct line 
(284). 
The "correct line" in this case, is the "line" of the 
"Movement" and most characters in the novel reveal a 
vulnerability to its persuasive force. The lack of an 
articulated political programme is often cited by its critics 
as a weakness in black consciousness thought, a lack which 
inevitably detracts from its efficacy. However, the goal of 
black consciousness was at that stage and very candidly, a 
specific one. Biko argues that the "first truth" is that the 
black man has lost his "personality" and that the retrieval 
of that personality is the first/primary hurdle to be crossed 
before one can really speak of political emancipation: 
This is the first truth, bitter as it may seem, that we 
have to acknowledge before we can start on any programme 
designed to change the status quo ... (29). 
Black consciousness, to a large extent, thus abdicates 
responsibility for determining the precise content of the 
"programme designed to change the status quo", but claims to 
be able to provide the necessary confidence with which to 
devise (a truly suitable) one. Biko reveals the black 
consciousness belief in the unique capacity of humankind to 
make and remake its own conscious life and the sentiments 
expressed here are closely aligned with existentialist 
thought. C.R.D. Halisi supports the notion of existentialism 
in black consciousness thinking when he argues that "at the 
core, Black Consciousness philosophy embraced the 
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existentialist view that individuals and communities choose 
freedom or enslavement (Pityana Ed. 101). This is reflected 
in Biko's chapter, "The Quest for a True Humanity" where he 
argues that, 
Freedom is the ability to define oneself with 
one's possibilities held back not by the power of 
other people over one but only by one's 
relationship to God and to natural surroundings. 
The existentialist conception of freedom is shown to be known 
by Biko, and can only be made real through a process of 
dissolving the bonds of power held over blacks by whites. 
Evidence of an existentialist position is given by Biko's 
(Heideggerian) contention that the black consciousness 
movement embodies an attempt to "make the black man see 
himself as a being complete in himself" (92). While Serote 
would seem to acknowledge the significance of black 
consciousness as a particular phase in the struggle for 
liberation, he also seems to be concerned to issue reminders 
of its limited application. Serote's novel seems to suggest 
that "Movement" politics ( here I read ANC politics) is a 
logical and organic outgrowth of black consciousness as 
represented by the "power days" and that black consciousness 
philosophy can be unproblematically subsumed by the discourse 
of Movement politics. The existentialist concept of choice, 
I would argue, is thus also· shown to have limited application 
in the South African political context as represented by 
Serote. Having committed oneself to making a choice for 
freedom, one must, in Serote' s terms, make the obvious choice 
of allegiance with the Movement. While black consciousness, 
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on a philosophical level, is existentialist insofar as it 
endorses the freedom to choose to change, the avenues open to 
those characters in To Every Birth Its Blood who seek change 
are necessarily limited, thus creating difficulties for 
absolute existentialist fulfilment. Tony Morphet's argument 
in "Cultural Imagination and Cultural Settlement" would seem 
to suggest that a crucial ingredient of the black 
consciousness ethic (as evidenced in his discussion of Biko 
in "Brushing History Against the Grain") has been lost 
through "Movement" politics resulting in the waning of the 
double hermeneutic of hope and suspicion and the decline in 
the commitment of members to dialectical thinking and 
analytical rigour. I would argue that the ideological 
manipulation by Serote of his material is akin to the closure 
of which Tony Morphet speaks. The loss of the dialectic which 
Morphet attributes to the work of both Biko and Turner 
becomes subsumed under the rhetoric of Serote' s Movement 
where the existence of only one choice is, in fact, no 
choice. 
In an interview with Jane Wilkinson in On the Horizon, Serote 
comments on the black consciousness movement that "it was a 
movement that didn't take the history of the struggle into 
consideration", but goes on to add that later, "the 
organisation [BC] itself became a vehicle through which the 
history of the struggle was explored" ( 17 8). Despite the 
secondary role he attributes to the black consciousness 
movement, he nevertheless recognises the need to view black 
consciousness positively because "it did mean that Blacks 
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could look at themselves as people, not as negatives of other 
people, and could assert themselves, especially the young 
people ... " ( 178). Serote suggests howe·ver, that these 
benefits are essentially limited, unless viewed in 
conjunction with an acknowledgement by black consciousness 
adherents of a •·very very long history of struggle" and an 
acknowledgement of "our very old and very experienced 
organisation, the African National Congress" ( 179). For 
Serote, however, such acknowledgement also marks '.'a point of 
departure" ( 17 9) from black consciousness. I would argue that 
it is this conception of black consciousness, as a secondary 




"Still Riding" : Staffrider as Cultural Product 
In the previous chapter I argued that Serote' s novel, To 
Every Birth Its Blood, reveals how the context of oppression 
in South Africa during the seventies and early eighties 
1 
necessitated the response of black consciousness discourse. 
Furthermore, in Serote's case, black consciousness discourse 
offered an important means for the location of the self vis­
a-vis a broader national framework. The concern of black 
consciousness with the development of a black identity in 
response to the debilitating effects of apartheid has been 
taken up in various cultural forms and has manifested itself 
across a far broader cultural spectrum than this thesis has 
been able to reflect. 
In recognition of this lacuna, this chapter will consider the 
role played by the magazine, Staffrider, in giving expression 
to a specifically "black" South African experience during the 
period 1978 to 1988. As I have attempted to argue, the 
discourse of black consciousness constituted a particular 
pivotal moment which allowed oppressed black South Africans 
to be interpellated into the culture and discourse of 
modernity. I would argue that this interpellating function is 
also performed by Staf frider, a publication which allowed for 
the cultural expression of ideas and feelings which were 
crucial to the development of a new consciousness in the 
national black community. 
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In an interview published in Staffrider, Christopher van Wyk, 
one-time editor of the magazine, argues that black 
consciousness was "the domi"nant ideological perspective of 
the time and we, like almost all cultural activists, 
subscribed to the self-reliance advocated by this 
perspective" (166). This culture of self-reliance was 
manifested by Staffrider in the form of the somewhat 
controversial "self-editing" policy adopted at the inception 
of the magazine which allowed blacks to determine standards 
of criticism applicable to their work because, it was argued, 
"[b)lacks ... knew what standards they would like to impose 
on their culture" ( 167). While this policy was the subject of 
criticism by, among others, Chris van Wyk himself, largely 
because of the stasis it encouraged within black writing 
circles, I would nevertheless argue that accepting literary 
and academic submissions from all kinds of writers, 
regardless of the extent of their education, created the 
means whereby black writers could enter into the "imagined 
community" (Benedict Anderson 1991 25) of the national 
oppressed. This process of interpellation made it possible 
for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about 
themselves, and to relate themselves to others in new ways.
The first editorial of the Ten Years of Staffrider collection 
bears witness to this self re-conceptualisation when it is 
remarked that, 
A feature of much of the new writing is its 
'direct line' to the community in which the writer 
lives ("About Staffrider" Vol 1 No 1, 1978). 
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The writer becomes the represen�ative of his or her 
comrnuni ty, voicing the concerns and frustrations of that 
community and in so doing, joins a multitude of other 
community writer representatives in a network of national 
solidarity. 
In an essay published in the "ten year" collection entitled, 
"Remembering Staffrider", · Mike Kirkwood writes that 
Staffrider protects the "right to write badly" (5), and I 
would add to this that the magazine also, importantly, 
protected and offered the right to write (badly) about 
oneself, and offers the writer the opportunity to enter into 
a national community of imagined readers, many of whom share 
similar life experiences through apartheid. Anderson's 
definition of nationalism as "an imagined politic al 
community" (6) would suggest that the cultural expression 
which Staffrider articulates, represents an opportunity for 
"nation-building". While the relationship to a broader 
political context may be an 
nevertheless a necessary one. 
"imagined" one, it is 
Kirkwood suggests that the magazine was integral to the 
process of historical retrieval in two respects: firstly, 
through the decolonisation of the material, a process he 
describes as "prising history from the death grip of the 
rulers ... [ and the] ... rewriting history from below" ( 7) and 
secondly, "the infusion ... of the continuity that links us 
with the almost simultaneous events in 1912-13 that exiled a 
people and embarked us on the great trek to freedom ... " (7). 
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The specifically black consciousness concern with the reading 
of South African history in terms of a history of black 
dispossession and resistance again forms the thematic 
substance of many of the submissions. In the preface to Ten 
Years of Staffrider, Andries Oliphant and Ivan Vladislavic 
note that by re-inserting the writings of earlier generations 
of black writers, the magazine assisted in the restoration of 
a suppressed tradition of resistance literature in South 
Africa. On a similar note, Kirkwood speaks of the interest 
shown by the readers of Staffrider in the history and 
dispersal of their ancestors brought about through various 
colonial strategies and argues a role for the magazine in the 
propagation of stories which tell/retell a "peoples history". 
As has been argued, this is a process in which both Biko and 
Serote, express a large degree of interest. 
The importance of Staffrider may also be understood in terms 
of the challenge it represented to "officially sanctioned 
culture and its concomitant aims of domination" (Preface) . In 
arguing that Staffrider allowed the "cultural perimeters of 
apartheid [to be] breached" (3), Kirkwood acknowledges the 
extent to which Staffrider represented a significant 
challenge to the cultural taste of established (white) 
society in South Africa. The black artist, as the "skelm of 
sorts", the disapproved, the disreputable, the cultural 
trouble-maker ( in terms of white artistic standards) occupies 
a position not dissimilar to major European artists of the 
avant-garde who faced a similar degree of disapproval on the 
grounds of their "rebellious" stance vis-a-vis the dominant 
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culture. Mr X's conversation with Miriam Tlali in the 
"Popular History" section of the edition, entitled, "You Have
to Be a Man'' elevates "Mr X" to the status of a community 
spokesperson. The fact that he is an unlicensed vendor places 
him in a rebellious position in relation to the (white) law 
of the country. His account of his life and his efforts to 
make a living and "to be a man", nevertheless speak of a 
great deal of initiative and industriousness and indeed, his 
tenacity is admirable. Mr X celebrates his position outside 
the discourse of white legal prohibitions and his repeated 
insistence that one has to "be a man" demonstrates a self­
reliance and realism necessary for adequate survival in 
township conditions. Mr X's opinion that "[y]ou've got to 
trust yourself" is reminiscent of the black consciousness 
slogan, "black man, you are on your own" denoting 
independence and self-reliance . 
. . . Black Consciousness makes the black man see 
himself as a being, entire in himself, and not as 
an extension of a broom or additional leverage to 
some machine ... (Biko 92). 
Biko's comment captures the real need for a project of self­
expression which allows for the reconceptualisation of the 
self in more positive terms. Staffrider, in providing a forum 
for the cultural products of oppressed communities and their 
individual members, I would suggest, performs a crucial role 
in the reconstitution and redevelopment of the black self and 
the black nation. 
-
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In Chris van Wyk's poem, "We Can't Meet Here, Brother" (for 
Thami Mnyele), the assertion of selfhood is strongly 
represented and much of this assertion is expressed against 
the invasiveness of white cultural and technological 
influence: 
We can't meet here, brother, 
We can't talk here in this cold stone world 
Where whites buy time on credit cards. 
I can't hear you, brother! 
for the noise of the theorists 
and the clanging machinery of the liberal Press! 
I want to smell the warmth of your friendship, Thami 
Not the Pollution of gunsmoke and white suicides. 
We can't meet here, brother 
Let's go to your home 
Where we can stroll in the underbrush of your paintings 
Discuss colour 
Hone assegais on the edges of serrated tongues. 
The white world is consistently depicted by Van Wyk as cold, 
hard, consumerist, industrial and theoretical -- qualities 
which are thrown into stark relief by the numerous references 
to warmth, home, texture and colour associated with black 
interests. The tendency towards "othering" and assertive 
polarities, characteristic of black consciousness discourse, 
is emphasised through the dichotomy set up between black and 
white and the experience of black alienation in what is 
perceived as a largely white-dominated "outside" world. The 
"inside" black world, on the other hand, symbolised by the 
word "home" is inviting in its warmth, subtlety and intimacy. 
The "inside" position, however, while suggest;ive of a place 
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of cultural and spiritual renewal, at the same time, points 
to the possibilities for more active resistance. 
The notion of a double life of submission and defiance 
captured to some extent in the preceding poem is taken up 
again in the following untitled poem by Farouk Sternmet and 
again the concept of the "machine" constitutes a focal point: 
another just-too-short weekend draws to a close 
while 
another much-too-long week looms ahead 
and like all faithful cogs in the unstoppable machine 
I will take my place. 
whenever I can 
I quietly slip out 
of the unstoppable machine 
and lodge myself into a new one: 
the one not quite complete, 
the one only just starting to move, 
but the one which promises, once in motion, 
to not merely stop the unstoppable, 
but to put it out of existence -
totally, completely and once and for all! 
I feel comfortable in this new machine -
for it is not of iron and steel, 
but of flesh and blood ... (275) 
The technology and machinery of the white world is 
counterpoised against the "flesh and blood" of the black 
resistance movement. Again, the alienation experienced by the 
black worker in the white paradigm is annulled by the comfort 
of the "new [black] machine". The two "machines" are seen to 
be in direct competition, victory being signified by the 
eradication of one by the other. Black and white worlds are 
thus presented as diametrically opposed entities. While it is 
the "unstoppable" machine that is contested, what is 
interesting is the idea of a new machine ( albeit of a 
different substance) assuming its place, The potential for 
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transformation offered by the "new" machine thus constitutes 
a form of resistance to the old machine, but such resistance 
is qualified by the extent to which the elements of language 
used to constitute its existence are borrowed ones. The new 
machine thus presents a challenge to the old, but at the same 
time, itself undergoes a degree of interpellation into the 
system of discourse constituting the old. The romanticisation 
of the new machine in terms of its "flesh and blood" 
attributes, reflects an optimistic belief in the existence 
and achievement of a utopia which, despite its intention to 
eradicate an order, constitutes, in itself, and thus offers 
for replacement, another order. 
Claire Lamont, writing of the Romantic Period in literature, 
notes that the resistance by the so-called Romantic poets to 
the emphasis on the material was motivated to a large extent 
by the fact that "[f]or most of them, there was a more real 
order, only to be glimpsed but which commanded their faithful 
allegiance" (275). For the Romantics, this "real order" was 
represented by a scepticism of society, particularly as 
embodied by the industrialising city and their response was 
a search for a more spiritual means of existence. A certain 
nostalgia is involved in the romantic return to a belief in 
the spiritual power of nature, a nostalgia which is repeated 
in aspects of modern literature almost a century later when, 
among other ideas of the time, it was asserted that 
"primitive myths can help us to grasp and order the chaos of 
twentieth century experience" ( Rogers ed. 408) . 
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To "grasp and order the chaos" can be seen to be a real 
concern of black South Africans whose identities were 
threatened with dissipation by apartheid. The poem, "Afrika 
(My Peace with Life)" by Eugene Skeef, depicts the Africa­
centredness of much black consciousness thought and writing 
and arms the African with a valuable sense of spiritual and 
historical security. The need for a "deeper order" manifests 
itself, in the case of this poem, through the personification 
of "Mother Africa": 
Afrika 
You are the horizon 
To which I turn 
To see the sun rise 
To wean the poet 
Who praises you daily 
For bearing your breasts 
To these my seasoned lips 
Do not desert me 
For I love you 
I want to cherish you 
Take me into your heart 
For you are the path 
Whereupon treads my pride 
Do not beguile me 
For you are the sky 
That measures my manhood 
And spares me stars 
To kindle my soul 
Let me drink of you 
For you are the river 
That flows with vigour 
Carrying the taunting tale 
Our forefathers died to tell ... 
Afrika 
You are my peace with life ... 
Africa is depicted as the symbol of hope and pride and the 
point of reference for existence itself. The historical 
profundity of the continent allows for an important sense of 
continuity between the present and the heroic past. Jean-
Francois Lyotard argues that realist art is driven by a 
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desire for totality and a "fantasy to seize reality" (148) 
but at the same time argues that "realism" is a myth. Much of 
this "desire for totality" is evident in the poem by Skeef in 
his conception of Africa as a continent in its entirety. To 
achieve such totality of vision is, however, impossible. The 
poets reliance on the horizon as a definitive and 
inspirational landmark is misdirected because it can offer no 
real fixity. Thus conception is inevitably limited. 
Against realism, however, Lyotard contrasts the modern (and 
postmodern) aesthetic, characterised by the "sublime 
sentiment". The sublime sentiment is a Kantian notion which 
characterises the logic of aesthetics which foregrounds a 
"lack of reality". In accordance with Kant, Lyotard notes 
that, the sublime is a "strong and equivocal" emotion which 
"carries with it both pleasure and pain'' or, more to the 
point, "pleasure derive[d] from pain" (143) and in the case 
of the modern aesthetic, is also nostalgic. According to 
Lyotard, the sublime occurs "when the imagination fails to 
present an object which might, if only in principle, come to 
match a concept" (143). In the modern nostalgic aesthetic, 
the sublime involves the registration of the unpresentable in 
the signifier while still longing for the corresponding 
signified (46). The modern aesthetic thus allows the 
"unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing 
contents; but the form, because of its recognisable 
consistency, continues to offer to the reader ... matter for 
solace and pleasure" (149). The real sublime sentiment, 
therefore, is the moment combining pleasure and pain: "the 
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pleasure that reason should exceed all presentation, the pain 
that imagination or sensibility should not be equal to the 
concept" ( 148) . Thus Skeef 's references to the river, the 
sky, to the continent of Africa convey the pleasure of a 
grand view, but because in reality, the poet can only 
perceive fragments of these elements at any one time, the 
pleasure is necessarily qualified by the pain of the 
unpresentable. 
In Charles Mungoshi 's poem, "burning log", the devastation of 
a colonial process which "turned to the past of the oppressed 
people and distorted, disfigured and destroyed it" (Biko 29) 
is captured in the analogy of burning: 
i am 
a burning log 
my history being reduced 
to ashes 
what i remember 
of yesterday 




is the fire. (234) 
The destruction of a "peoples' history" by apartheid is shown 
to have the dual effects of defeatism and inspiration on its 
victims. The poem leaves the lasting impression, however, of 
assertion and defiance. Again, the extended metaphor of the 
log is a pre-modern and nostalgic evocation of an agrarian 
lifestyle. The log disintegrates through fire, but it is fire 
which takes its place and which provides future hope. 
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The view, expressed by Mbulelo Mzamane, that the legacy of 
the black consciousness movement lies in the "way culture 
came to take on the burden of articulating African political 
aspirations after the African National Congress and the Pan 
Africanist Congress had been outlawed in 1960" (Pityana Ed 
185), while evident in the vehemence of the poetry examined 
above, is carried forward in the short stories of the 
Staffrider collection in a different way through the 
construction of community. The short story, as a genre which 
is able to create a "community" of characters, plays an 
important role in the creation of a discursive home for 
community members and to some extent defines their relation 
to the broader political framework. 
The conversational tone of Mtutuzeli Matshoba's short story, 
"My Friend, the Outcast" has the effect of inviting the 
reader to participate in a shared experience. This sense of 
community is emphasised by the narrator's admission that 
while not being present when many of the ensuing events 
unfolded, he is nevertheless able to "imagine" how things 
transpired "what with such things being part of life for us 
darkies" ( 12). The reader is drawn into an epistemic 
community of people, bound by their shared knowledge and 
understanding of the way oppression and poverty manifests 
itself in black South Africa. Matshoba's story depicts, in a 
consistently conversational tone, the brutality of the white 
system of governance, where power is exercised arbitrarily 
and unjustly and white officials have the power to create 
"truth" in the context of a powerless community of victims. 
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Vusi and his mother are shown to have "come to accept that 
they owed" (18) extra rental money and indeed, the 
alternatives are shown to be non-existent and Vusi himself is 
reduced to exercising his "best pleading voice" (21) in the 
face of white obstinacy. Dikeledi is described as lacking 
confidence when talking to the new tenant of their house -­
" ... the way she felt when she faced a white man" (24) and 
Vusi's mother seems almost relieved to relinquish 
responsibility in the fight to regain her house on the 
grounds that she had allowed herself to become one of the 
"sacrificial lambs" of the white man. While the white 
officials at the housing office articulate their attitudes 
towards the black people with whom they deal in terms of 
gross stereotypes, it is only through a subtle ironical tone 
that Matshoba seems to contest their positions. The only 
reference to any overt form of black resistance is in the 
context of a remark made by the housing superintendent that 
he cannot produce a receipt to prove payment because such 
records were destroyed in the burnings initiated by the youth 
of the "black power period" ( 17). At the end of the short 
story, upon having been kindly treated by Vusi's "pleasant 
white'' employer, Vusi and the narrator marvel at 11 [h]ow 
contrasting people can be" and the story ends without the 
affair being resolved. 
The articulation of "black political aspirations 11 (Mzamane 
185) in this particular story, is conveyed in a different
form to that of the implicit militancy of the previously­
discussed poetry contained in the Staffrider collection. The 
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strength of Matshoba's story, however, (and this is a point 
made by Michael Vaughan in his critique of Matshoba's stories 
( also in Ten Years of Staffrider). lies in the exemplary 
quality of the story. As Vaughan argues, Matshoba's stories 
treat "the situation that is its subject-matter as a model 
situation, from which a lesson can be derived" (312). 
In "My Friend, the Outcast" Matshoba's lesson revolves around 
the importance of community support. Vusi 's neighbourhood 
comes to the aid of his family when they are locked out of 
their home. The community is shown to make willingly real 
sacrifices in order to ease the plight of the destitute 
family. The lesson of individual humanism also seems to be 
apparent. The helpfulness of the English-speaking press and 
the kindness of Vusi's white employer are set against the 
tyranny and racism of the (white) government officials and 
their (black) lackeys. Matshoba's story, in the final 
analysis, offers little guidance with regard to the 
formulation of a strategy of resistance against white 
domination. While this would seem to be contrary to the 
spirit of defiance embodied by black consciousness, I would 
suggest that the support and solidarity shown by the 
community towards Vusi's family means that ultimately, it is 
the community that is shown to be victorious and to occupy 
the moral high ground in relation to the forces of oppression 
and exploitation. While most of the stories in the Staffrider 
collection tend to lack the element of the dramatic, 
particularly in their resolution, I would suggest that this 
strategy should be understood in terms of the intention of 
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the writers concerned to appeal to a sense of shared 
experience. The first editorial to the magazine describes 
this intention: 
''[t]he writer is attempting to voice the community's 
experience ('This is how it is') and his immediate 
audience is the community ('Am I right?')". 
The emphasis on community orientation is taken up in an essay 
entitled, "Thoughts on Bongiwe and the Role of Revolutionary 
Art", written for Staf frider by Thamsanga Mnyele. In her 
discussion of South African artist Bongiwe Dhlomo' s 
exhibition at Botswana National Museum and Art Gallery, 
Mnyele notes how she is struck by the development of a new 
art in South Africa and calls for the birth of a new cultural 
worker: 
We must now create this new man and woman whose 
visuals and songs will be informed by the most 
pressing needs and demands of their time, place 
and circumstances (299). 
Mnyele's vision endorses the move away from individual 
consciousness to a collective consciousness manifested 
through collective cultural efforts. The necessity of black 
solidarity is again expressed in an interview conducted by 
Jaki Seroke at the African Writers Association Meeting in 
1981, published in Staffrider and entitled "Black Writers in 
South Africa". On the issue of the lack of promotion of black· 
literature by the black press in South Africa, Mothobi 
Mutloatse argues that, "(t)he black press seems not to have 
found its cultural base. It is still mostly conceived on the 
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western concept of viewing our life" (305). He goes on to 
argue that in recognising the achievements of black artists, 
the press should extend the scope of their concerns to the 
"whole black diaspora 11 { 305). The perceived fact of blackness 
is held to contain the seeds of solidarity. 
Sipho Sepamla takes the issue of black solidarity to extremes 
when he accuses black consciousness adherents who are 
critical of black artists of not having understood the true 
nature of black consciousness philosophy. He argues that in 
being critical of the work of these artists, black critics 
reveal that "we are full of self hate as black people in this 
country (307)" and argues for a common understanding of what 
black consciousness is. This understanding, according to 
Sepamla is to be gained from listening to the man in the 
street. The self-editing policy of Staffrider which seemed to 
endorse this view of unrestrained black expression is best 
understood, I would argue, within its particular historical 
and cultural context. In his interview referred to earlier, 
Chris Van Wyk explains that his reluctance to join the 
editorial board of Staffrider was based on its loose 
editorial policy which, he argued, "led to a situation where 
some work, especially poetry, was published although it did 
not merit publication" (166). Van Wyk also notes the danger 
which existed that work which "dwelt so persistently on the 
manifestations of oppression ... ironically exacerbated 
oppression instead of assisting with its eradication" (167). 
Van Wyk argues that problems of this nature could be 
addressed only marginally by the particular editorial policy 
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of the magazine and that in reality, the problem required 
"critical intervention and long-tenn strategies which would 
replace the reactive protest writing with a more profound 
imaginative engagement with South African reality" (167). 
Many of Van Wyk's concerns are reiterated by Njabulo Ndebele 
in the Staffrider ten year collection. In an interview with 
Andries Oliphant, Ndebele gives credit to Staffrider when he 
argues that the magazine was involved in re-emergence of 
resistance movements in the seventies and the spread of a 
democratic culture, giving more people an effective say in 
social, cultural, political affairs affecting them (346). 
However, the importance of self-criticism and self­
evaluation, of "avoiding trivialisation and infusing greater 
complexity and richness" ( 34 3) into creative writing are also 
emphasised by Ndebele. Ndebele holds the view that a 
concentration on literary skill and technique does not 
necessarily mean a loss of political relevance, but instead, 
"mastery over one's craft enables one to return to social and 
political issues with far greater freedom, understanding, 
insight and comprehensiveness" (343). Many of these issues 
and viewpoints are discussed in more depth by Ndebele in his 
article entitled, "Turkish Tales and Some Thoughts on South 
African Fiction" also published in the ten year Staffrider 
collection. The critic al stance adopted by Ndebele would seem 
to directly contest the notion of unqualified black 
solidarity on the part of black critics as articulated by 
Sepamla in the panel discussion mediated by Jaki Seroke. In 
fact, Ndebele makes direct reference to this panel discussion 
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in his article and I would suggest that publishing 
controversial articles together in one volume has the effect 
of portraying Staffrider as a forum not only for the 
expression of (then) current political aspirations and 
feelings, but also for cultural and theoretical debates 
involving issues which have an important bearing on the 
future development of culture in South Africa. 
Elleke Boehmer describes postcoloniality as "that condition 
in which colonized peoples seek to take their place, forcibly 
or otherwise, as historical subjects" (3). This "condition" 
is articulated in the production of Staffrider. The 
submissions published by it represent the attempts by 
marginalised people, to stake a claim for themselves in both 
the historical and future development of their country. Ben 
Okri's conception of postcolonial literature as "literature 
of the newly ascendant spirit" 7 describes the enthusiasm and 
earnestness which characterises the writing of Staffrider. 
Staffrider provided a vehicle through which the participants 
therein could generate a self-conception and a re-invention 
of the self which functioned as a significant interpellative 
counterpoint to the historical condition of being the 
marginalised "other" of the racial modernity which was 
apartheid. This function existed independently of questions 
of the quality of the writing itself. Before issues of the 
"literary merit" of the writing in Staffrider can be dealt 
with, it is valuable to conceive of Staffrider as a praxis 
which facilitated a space for the textual experimentation 
necessary for the "ascendant spirit" to "write" itself into 
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"history". To write is to make the visible, tangible marks by 
which the colonising cultures had been able to define their 
mark on history as that of "civilisation", indeed of being 
History itself. From the point of view of the colonising 
culture, "History" only existed for those cultures which 
could lay claim to a tradition of the written recording and 
artistic expression thereof, and hence their claims to the 
concept of "civilisation". It is in relation to this point 
that the interpellative value of Staffrider was the "writing" 
(in the most literal sense) of the ' black" into the History 
which, from the point of view of back South Africans, had to 
be contested. 
Staffrider also exists as a subversive account of 
"literariness" despite the fact that the practice of writing 
and publication (and the medium of English itself) is 
appropriated from "white" culture. The codes of European 
discourse embodied in what Mike Kirkwood terms, the "cultural 
perimeters of apartheid", are dismantled and the domination 
of cultural production by Europeans is subverted. Thus the 
"becoming" of "historical subjects" as represented in the 
writing of Staff rider and black consciousness more generally, 
is characterised by the double move of being counterpoised to 
the dominant colonial culture but deriving this oppositional 
status only to the extent that the discourse can find an 
expression within that dominant culture. The point is that a 
discourse cannot be oppositional if it is not heard or 
recognised by the dominant power as such, and concomitantly 
the oppositional and empowering status of a discourse depends 
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on the knowledge of the participants therein that it is 
perceived as such. Hence the discourse's status as being both 
oppositional and interpellating. 
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CONCLUSION 
Peter Jones pays tribute to the influence of the black 
consciousness movement when he argues that it is a "terrible 
misconception" to believe that the African National Congress 
was the "only saviour" because "the whole movement inspired 
people greatly ... [and] opened up a new dimension in the way 
that people saw themselves, the way they saw their role 
within the world ... " (Video Interview). 
This thesis has attempted to document the dimensions of the 
process of conceptualising a "role within the world". It has 
sought to demonstrate how the discourse of black 
consciousness was an integral part of the re-definition of 
self necessary for black South Africans to resist apartheid. 
I have argued that part of this re-definition demanded both 
a "re-covery" of History on the part of black South Africans, 
as well as a "re-invention" which a,llowed black South 
Africans to conceive of themselves as possible participants 
within modernity. In many ways, the cultural and political 
expressions of black consciousness demonstrated features not 
dissimilar to comparable moments in European modernism. In 
this sense black consciousness, although it would not have 
conceived of itself in this way, could be described as an 
avant-garde interrogation of the self. 
My analysis of Se rote's To Every Birth it's Blood and 
Staffrider has attempted to demonstrate how the cultural 
production of black consciousness was oppositional to 
apartheid. However, my analysis has also attempted to show 
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how black consciousness nevertheless shared crucial tropes 
with European Modernism: the self, the subverting of received 
aesthetic standards and oppositionality more generally. In 
this sense, the black consciousness movement could be said to 
have constituted a "discourse of two worlds". While the 
participation of identitarian politics in the recreation of 
a self-knowing subject is complicit in the project of 
Enlightenment and historical rationalism, the emphasis of 
black consciousness on the preservation of a cultural memory 
and a reliance on "pre-modern'' symbolic language creates a 
position which is paradoxical, yet nevertheless interesting. 
While giving evidence at the SASO/BPC Trial in May 1976, Biko
argues strongly in favour of a "one man, one vote" democratic 
framework and, in this way, embraces the traditions of 
enlightenment characterising the unconditional extension of 
political and civil liberties. The appropriation of "human 
rights discourse" against the South African justice system, 
in order to expose the essential limitations of such a 
system, demonstrates the efficacy of a strategy which 
appropriates the universal claim to justice as a means of 
ultimately challenging and transforming it. The possibilities 
for creating a "new" position on this basis 
significantly, most aptly expressed by Biko himself: 
I'm black and I'm proud. This is fast becoming our 
modern culture. A culture of defiance, self­
assertion and group pride and solidarity ... This is 
the new modern black culture to which we have 
given a major contribution. This is the modern 
black culture that is responsible for the 
restoration of· our faith in ourselves and 
therefore offers us hope in the direction we are 
taking from here (46). 
are, 
NOTES 
1. These words are taken from an interview with Biko - from
a video entitled Biko: The Spirit Lives screened on
NNTV, June 1995.
2. I am indebted for these ideas to Professor David
Attwell. Although applying these ideas to the philosophy
of Negritude in particular, I believe that Attwell's
understanding of the development of Negritude also
contains many insights for black consciousness.
3. It is interesting that Biko himself makes this point
when he argues, against the accusation of reverse
racism, that "one cannot be a racist unless. he has the
power to subjugate" (25).
4. Peter Jones was apprehended with Steve Biko while
travelling back from Cape Town. It was this particular
arrest which led to Biko's detention and his death.
Jones was later released. His comments are taken from
the video Biko: The Spirit Lives.
5. The "quest" is, however, carried out in very different
circumstances to that of the European intellectual.
Tsi 's recognised position as an intellectual in the
Alexandra Community is articulated by Aunt Miriam's
daughter, Kgoli, who jokingly declines to be Tsi's wife
because he is "the educated type", the kind who "end up
on Robben Island" (36). Tsi is thus already inscribed
within the discourse of western academia and critical
thinking. The means by which to challenge apartheid from
this position of "double consciousness" (Gilroy) takes
on a more complicated aspect.
6. Black Students Organisation - affiliate of the black
consciousness movement.
7. "The Marvellous Responsibility of the Unseen", Arthur
Ravenscroft Memorial Lecture, University of Leeds, 17
March 1994, cited in Boehmer, page 4.
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